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THE PROBLEM OF CONSCIENCE IN THE  
NOVELS OF ALFRED ANDERSCH

by



ELROY J. CARLSON

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH  
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The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research for acceptance, a thesis entitled THE PROBLEM OF CONSCIENCE IN THE NOVELS OF ALFRED ANDERSCH, submitted by Elroy J. Carlson in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.



## ABSTRACT

Critical evaluations of works by Alfred Andersch virtually ignore conscience, a topic which Andersch addresses in each of his five novels. Conscience is based on values. In Western society there are two views on the origin of values. One view is based on humanistic ideals which hold that values are an inherent part of man, centered in his intellect. The other perspective anchors the source of values in a divine being, who exists independently of man and who uses various means to transmit these values to man.

Andersch reveals the bases for his own conscience in Die Kirschen der Freiheit. It is obvious that his values are derived from the humanistic tradition. He eschews not only religion but also economic and political doctrine, which in Western society have taken on an orthodoxy as inflexible as religious dogma.

In Sansibar oder der letzte Grund the contest between humanistically based conscience and religiously and politically inspired conscience takes place among several characters. By using a large cast of characters, Andersch demonstrates the consequences of a conscience based on each view. His message continues to be that a deterministic source of values is not a sound basis for an effective conscience.

The story of Franziska in Die Rote demonstrates the same point, although the narrative is less direct. Franziska's conscience takes direction from outside, bourgeois sources. Unfortunately, her dependency on direction from outside sources is so strong that she is unable to attain the independent life she wants.





In Efraim Andersch demonstrates the consequences of having no conscience at all. Efraim possesses no central core of values. He believes that coincidence and caprice rule men's lives and that it is useless for man to try to influence events. As a result, Efraim leads a rootless, uncommitted existence, which brings him no satisfaction. Through Efraim, Andersch reiterates the view that a humanistically based conscience is essential for a truly moral life. Winterspelt repeats this message through character types borrowed from previous Andersch novels.

It is clear to Andersch that man devises religious and political doctrines to explain and codify human behavior. It is equally clear to him that such codifications are perceived all too often as ends in themselves, as immutable loci to which man subjugates personal will in order to uphold the notion that a higher authority exists to pass judgement on man's actions.

Andersch sees great danger in elevating these humanly contrived doctrines to the level where they become deterministic and dictate human action by a sequence of causes independent of free will. To him it is important to maintain the correct perception of such mental constructs. He believes the human act precedes the justification for it; the rightness or wrongness of an act is judged later upon reflection by man. To Andersch there is no god in the Christian sense who stands in judgement over human actions. Nor is there an economic or political order which determines how man should behave. In Andersch's view, such a god and such doctrines are created by man because of his need to provide explanations for human acts. Andersch perceives man as the ultimate source of the values represented by these mental constructs and the





conscience to which the values give rise. He suggests in his novels that it is far healthier for man to believe in himself than in a divine spirit or alluring doctrine. From this belief will presumably come a more honest and therefore better basis for conscience.



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## INTRODUCTION

The first problem of conscience is to define what is meant by the term "conscience". Carl Jung provides a convenient definition when he says "'Gewissen' bedeutet im allgemeinen Sprachgebrauch die Gewissheit des Vorhandenseins eines Faktors, welcher im Fall des 'guten Gewissens' einen Entschluss oder eine Tat als der Sitte gemäss bestätigt und im umgekehrten Fall als 'unsittlich' verurteilt.'" <sup>1</sup>

Jung's definition is useful because it introduces two important aspects of the psychic reaction known as conscience. One aspect is the knowledge or certainty that a thought or deed will be approved or condemned by custom or tradition. The second aspect is the set of shared values and customs itself.

We are taught rules and customs as well as the compunction to adhere to them. This is accomplished by rewarding behavior which follows the rules and punishing behavior which defies those rules. The rules and the obligation to adhere to them become an integral part of our psychic make-up. As Jung explains it, adhering to common rules of behavior fulfills the learned sense of obligation and a good conscience results. A bad conscience ensues when the rules are broken and when one counters the sense of obligation to adhere to them. Living in harmony with one's conscience is a paramount goal in Western society. It is considered the prerequisite for a happy life.

This brief definition establishes that conscience is a mental activity or psychic reaction which is based on the certainty that





particular values and customs are valid and that they must be adhered to.

There is no question that such rules and that such a sense of obligation are necessary and observable elements of any society. There is contention, however, as to the ultimate source of these values and the compunction to adhere to them.

In Western society there are two views on the origin of moral values and the need to follow them. Either the values are perceived as having originated within man; that is, they are the result of rational processes for which man is solely responsible, or they are perceived as having been presented to man from a supra-terrestrial source and then incorporated into man's rationality, for which man is likewise indebted to the higher entity. The former perception represents the humanistic viewpoint. The latter viewpoint in Western culture is embodied in the Judeo-Christian ethic.

The originator of the ideals of Western humanism was Socrates. He created an intellectual and moral tradition rooted in the belief that man is a rational being and that the free exercise of his intellect is the highest goal to which man aspires. The Socratic method and the Socratic goal are one and the same, introspection and knowledge of self. They are directed toward exercising the unique quality of human reason. Their application has enormous consequences for the perception of the origin of moral values. Maritain, for example, says of Socrates, "When he told his listeners to turn toward self-knowledge, he was not directing them to a metaphysical grasp of the esse of the soul through the discipline of the void; he was directing them toward a rational knowledge of the realities of the moral world and the essences it comprises, achieved by the consciousness



and by introspection, and requiring for its perfection the definitions and demonstrations of discursive science."<sup>2</sup> Thus, when questioning the origin of moral values, Socrates requires that his followers look into themselves and question motivation and behavior in human, rational terms, divorced from any metaphysical cant. His method requires great discipline and incessant interrogation. Its chief virtue is its extraordinary honesty.

The result of such introspection and objective interrogation is the perception that moral codes are an inherent part of human existence. Living according to a set of rules accepted by all is a defining characteristic of human life. Maritain neatly summarizes this aspect when he states, "For men did not await the coming of the moralists in order to have moral rules, and the moralists justify a given which ante-dates them and which has more practical consistency and more existential density than the theories by means of which they attempt to account for it. They are educators and reformers of customs, and they depend on customs. Fine reformers, who in the end justify what the baker and the candlestick-maker already firmly believed in (even if they did not act accordingly)."<sup>3</sup>

Socratic philosophy operates on such an assumption in regard to the origin of moral values. Such values are viewed as an integral part of human consciousness. Introspection and self-interrogation are means whereby this inherent knowledge is brought to light. These activities, in turn, are functions of man's rationality.

Socratic philosophy emphasizes the uniqueness of man as a rational being. Man through his rationality defines himself and his environment. His happiness and his despair are found on earth and are the result of his own actions. He defines his own morality as well.





This view contrasts with that of the Judeo-Christian ethic. The ancient Jewish faith was an exclusive religion, restricted to the related tribes of Israel and based on fealty to one god, Yahweh. As the books of the Old Testament tell us, Yahweh was regarded as the creator of the universe. Man served at His pleasure, and His rules and injunctions were believed superior to the best efforts of man.

To the Jew, life on earth was a period of testing, a time during which he or she had to endure and overcome the vagaries of God's will in order to prove himself or herself worthy of eternal life with God. The injunctions of the Ten Commandments were considered the rules by which one conducted one's self during this period of testing. Legend tells us that Moses received the inscribed tablets of stone directly from the hand of Yahweh. These Ten Commandments are the most obvious example of man receiving moral guidance from an outside entity.

The main message of the Ten Commandments is that the repression of self-interest in favor of one's neighbor is the most important element of a good life. In addition, the reward for leading such a good life is admission to the eternal Kingdom of God, where there are no more earthly wants. Life on earth remains a painful experience, regardless of man's best efforts to improve conditions. There is no promise of salvation or happiness on earth. Salvation and happiness can only be obtained upon death and subsequent admission to the restricted portals of heaven.

The teachings of Christ are based on these same tenets of the Jewish faith. Christ taught self-abnegation and subservience to the will of God. In contrast to the exclusivity of the Jewish faith, however, Christ claimed that His message was of universal application.



Not only Jews, but every person could enjoy an eternal life hereafter by renouncing self-interest and dedicating one's self to the abstract notion of a single god. Christ's message was directed in particular to the dispossessed and disadvantaged, to whom he eloquently speaks in the Sermon on the Mount. The message of hope he proffers them accounts, in part, for the rapid spread of Christianity in its early years.

Christ was a boon to mono-theistic Jewish teachings. Through the evangelical zeal which He inspired, the notion of a religion based on one god spread throughout Europe and supplanted the pagan gods of the native population. Later, under the same evangelical fervor, the Christian religion was carried to the remotest areas of the earth.

The importance of all this is that the tenets of a religion that had once been the exclusive property of nomadic sheep herders spread to become a major factor in shaping human life. For nearly a thousand years, from the end of the Roman Empire to the beginning of the Renaissance, the Christian Church was the center of political power and the supreme social and cultural force in Western civilization. The view of life and the moral values which the Church espouses are still recognized forces in modern Western society. The view is still extant that one god is responsible for the existence of man and that it is from this god that man receives instructions how to behave.

The competing and contrasting elements of humanism and the Judeo-Christian ethic described here have shaped modern man's conscience. It is clear that neither viewpoint dominates in contemporary intellectual or social efforts. Men do not always act rationally, and Christ's message of charity can hardly be considered a dominant element of capitalistic Western life. Yet elements of both humanism and Christianity are apparent in contemporary life. Indeed, the progress



and the values of modern man, such as they are, are the result of the interplay between humanistic values and Christianity.

The Socratic method, for example, inspires scientific inquiry. The belief that all things are knowable leads to the search for causes. This, in turn, leads to the observation that certain apparently immutable laws are at work in man's environment. By immutable it is meant that these laws do not respond to man's efforts to influence them. However, by continually asking questions, man increases his knowledge of nature's laws and encroaches on the boundaries which nature imposes. Thus, scientists see unimpeded exercise of the intellect as man's primary tool for dealing with nature. Inherent in this view is the perception of man as a part of nature, sharing nature's cyclical pattern. There is no promise of salvation or ascension into heaven at the end of man's physical existence.

By contrast, the Judeo-Christian ethic sees events as an historical progression. God created the earth according to a specific timetable. Human life progresses in similar linear fashion. Man is born; man lives a finite period on earth; man dies and goes to heaven. A cyclical pattern is perceived in nature, the waxing and waning of natural life in response to the seasons. Man's life, however, remains linear, historical. Man may be dependent upon nature for physical sustenance, but at the same time his relationship with God, which promises him freedom from the vagaries of nature and which allows him to see himself as an historical creature, sets him apart from the laws of nature. The perception predominates that man's ultimate destiny is not linked with events on earth. Thus, inherent in the Judeo-Christian view is the perception that man is separate from nature and that nature is subservient to man.





Through the Judeo-Christian ethic Western man has received the impetus to change the environment, to make nature serve his will. Through rationality and intellect, by recognizing causalities, man is able to discover how things work and how to use laws of nature to help carry out the work of altering the environment. Progress in modern life can thus be seen as the result of the interplay between the historical view provided by Christianity, which sets man apart from nature yet subservient to God, and the humanistic view, which regards man as a unique creature with a superior intellect who also has an obligation to himself to exercise and strengthen this intellect. The conscience of modern man, which is determined by these conflicting views and values, is thus infinitely more interesting than, for example, the conscience of medieval man.

The conscience of medieval man was governed by the values of the Church. Medieval man could be expected to react to moral dilemmas in a predictable manner. His moral code was programmed into him by the Church, which had control over the most routine matters of life. The strict control by the Church was loosened during the Renaissance when intellectuals of that period encountered the lost knowledge of ancient Greece and Rome. Through Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, and Virgil, among others, Renaissance thinkers came upon old models of thought on which to base moral conduct. The Greeks, as mentioned, recognized the primacy of the human mind in determining human behavior. When Renaissance European intellectuals also adopted this point of view, they rejected the Church, although not necessarily Christ, as the source and final arbiter of moral values.

Some intellectuals, notably St. Thomas of Aquinas, attempted



to graft the clear logic of the Greek and Roman philosophers onto the teachings of the Church in order to give the Church's metaphysical dogma a more concrete basis in reason. An intellectual tidying up was seen as necessary. This was prompted by the newly acquired knowledge about the Greeks and Romans. The Greeks in particular had reached seeming perfection in art, architecture, and discourse. The artifacts and documents from their society bespoke accomplishments which Renaissance men could only dream of ever attaining. Yet all this was accomplished by pagan people, without the blessings of the Christian god.

It was hoped that by applying similar reasoning to the contemporary situation, a church dogma could be produced which would possess the same logical neatness of Greek philosophy. It was hoped as well that a Christian society would then result which would attain equal heights of accomplishment. Christian revisionists wanted to make church doctrine, the basis of medieval society, appear equal to the clearly thought out systems of Greek philosophy.

Such an effort, however, was pre-destined to fail. The re-emergence of Greek and Roman thought in intellectual circles changed forever the perception of the ultimate source of moral values. Once human reason and intellect were perceived as equal to, or even superior to, church dogma, there was no longer a need to adhere to the dogma. Brave thinkers dared execution as heretics to conclude that both views are incompatible with one another. In their view, either one recognizes that man and his reason are the defining elements of the world, or one ascribes the center of things to another entity. Either man is free in the exercise of his intellect,





or man serves at the pleasure of God. Attempts to mix these two notions have resulted in the hybrid hypothesis that man has a free will, but that this will is the gift of God and that man is obligated to exercise it as God demands, on pain of eternal damnation in hell. This viewpoint is difficult to uphold, however.

If one is going to grant man the ability to make decisions on a free and rational basis, then one must also reserve for man the ability to set standards by which those acts can be judged. It is unfair and illogical to say man is free to behave in a certain manner and then condemn man for exercising this right when his behavior does not conform to standards which are seen as originating outside of the experience of man.

This then brings us to the center of the discussion in regard to the novels of Alfred Andersch. His novels revolve around the idea that true moral values, and therefore the true basis of conscience, come from man himself. Andersch maintains that it is false to assume that these values are imposed upon man by an outside entity. He describes how he reaches this conclusion in his autobiographical account Die Kirschen der Freiheit. The other four novels deal with the same idea, through different characterizations and with varying degrees of success.

Central to each novel are the events of the Second World War. Andersch's works fit comfortably under the rubric of "Vergangenheitsbewältigung". They are, however, more than mere efforts to explain the past. The horrible events of that war are symptoms of a larger problem which confronts modern man. The problem is embodied in man's struggle to attain harmony between the things his ever expanding



knowledge tells him are correct and those things which custom and society have taught him to believe are true.

Nietzsche was one of the few far-sighted thinkers to diagnose this predicament of modern man. He correctly judged, for example, that traditional Christian values had been supplanted long ago by materialism and nihilism, even though society continued to profess belief in God. His proclamation that "God is dead" is an expression of the change in values which had begun with the Renaissance and which had been completed during the Industrial Revolution. To him it was evident that man had turned from God and Christian values and subjugated himself to machines and economic ideologies and would soon, he predicted, subjugate himself to political dogma as well. Nietzsche saw that this shift in dependency represented no progressive step for man. Man merely changed one form of subjugation to an outside entity for another. The important material changes which were made possible by man's intellect and which improved man's physical existence were not accompanied by equal changes in the way man perceived himself. The locus of his existence was still centered in an outside entity. This entity embodied itself in assumed economic and political certainties which took on the power or religious orthodoxy.

This transition from one source of values to another is recognized by Andersch. He portrays the change symbolically in the description of the death of his father. "Eine Epoche war zu Ende gegangen, als mein Vater auf der Strasse der Geschichte zusammenbrach, als er sterbend das lutherische Passionslied sang. Die, die nach dem alten deutschen Konservativen kamen, begannen etwas ganz Neues: sie dachten nicht mehr



an das Antlitz eines Gottes, als sie die Häupter der Menschen mit Blut und Wunden krönten."<sup>4</sup>

The perceived source of values had changed, but this had no effect on the condition of man. Killing was still carried out in the same fashion, only now the reason was transferred from God to a deified dictator who embodied a confused set of economic and political ideals. Andersch draws the conclusion from this situation that man is wrong if he seeks moral guidance from an outside entity, regardless whether that entity is a perceived supra-terrestrial God or a fellow human being elevated to the status of a god because of his political and economic doctrines. Through the characterizations in his novels Andersch continually poses the question, if true moral direction from such deities is impossible, where then should modern man seek the values on which to base his conscience?

Andersch does not consider the church a meaningful source of moral values. His conclusion about the Church is based on personal experience as well as the historical fact that the Judeo-Christian ethic has failed. His own personal experience has also placed him in contact with Marxism, a political ideology which propounds an alternate system of values. Andersch finds fault with this system because it, as the Church, denies the freedom of the individual will.

In Andersch's view the answers to moral questions can not be found in traditional Christian values nor in organized political philosophies which have developed as alternatives to traditional Christian values. Rather, Andersch appears to be a moralist in a humanistic sense. His characters represent the view that it is incumbent upon man to ascertain his own moral values. These values





must come from the human experience itself. Andersch believes that man is responsible for his own actions. Man answers only to himself and therefore need not rely on God or an abstract philosophy for moral guidance. Philosophy is only a means by which man attempts to categorize and quantify his human behavior. It is not an end in itself. Religions and political ideologies have a claim to immutability only as far as man grants them that claim. If man has a will of his own to act on his own behalf, then he need not chain himself to religions and ideologies which only partially explain his behavior.

Christoph Burgauner is correct when he says that Andersch's characters "sind einer Drohung, einem Druck ausgesetzt. Allen wird die Möglichkeit geboten, diesem Druck zu entkommen. Die Auseinandersetzung mit diesen Angeboten ist eine moralische."<sup>5</sup> The pressure to which Andersch's characters are subjected is the pressure exerted by society on all individuals to conform to accepted values. The characters find themselves in situations where they can either sacrifice their ability to act on their own behalf by subjugating themselves to a religion or ideology which seeks to explain existence through its own narrow terms, or function as free thinkers and decide on a course of action which serves their own ends but which is considerate of others as well.

The challenge for modern man, and indeed men of all ages, is to find real values in life. This search for truth has been hindered more than helped by religious and political ideologies. Andersch does not claim that he has found the final answer to man's eternal striving for truth. But his novels suggest that if any answer is to be found, it will come from man himself and not in the guise of a deity or in the



platitudes of a political ideology. "Ich mag das Wort Engagement nicht mehr: während das Wort Humanität für mich nichts von seinem Wert verloren hat."<sup>6</sup>

This statement by Andersch can be considered a leitmotif which courses through each of his five novels. Recognition of the importance of this attitude is absent from most critical evaluations of his novels. Only Karl Markus Michel finds evidence of Andersch's attitude and that, strangely enough, in Die Rote. "Erst dann gewinnt das Buch eine innere Einheit, wenn man es weniger als Roman sieht, vielmehr als ein streng stilisiertes zeitkritisches Panorama, das mit Brillanz und Unerbittlichkeit Fragen stellt und Antworten sucht auf die Probleme der politischen, moralischen und künstlerischen Existenz unserer Zeit. Man hat Andersch einen Neoveristen genannt. Man sollte ihn besser einen Neo-Moralisten nennen, einen artistischen Moralisten, der stets auf die Wirklichkeit zielt - nicht um sie episch vor uns zu entfalten, sondern um sie mit heftigem Zugriff anzupacken und in eine eigenwillige Form zu zwingen, die sowohl Kritik am Bestehenden übt als auch ein positives Modell entwirft. Es wird neue Modelle herausfordern, bei jedem Leser, darin liegt der Reiz und die Bedeutung des Buches."<sup>7</sup> Michel's contention in regard to Die Rote as a positive model will be discussed later. However, his other remarks about Andersch as a moralist are quite correct.

Andersch's characters continually question the worth of religiously or politically based values in determining modern man's conscience. His positively portrayed characters suggest that if any values are to apply at all, those values should be free of metaphysical cant and political ideology. Andersch's own experience has shown that religion



and ideology deny freedom of human will and counteract the rationality and humanity inherent in man.

This insight on the part of Andersch is not a source of despair. He finds purpose, freedom, and elation in abandoning traditional false values. He suggests that the final hope for man resides within man himself, and that man need only summon the courage to look inward and acknowledge himself as the good and true source of moral values.





## CHAPTER I - DIE KIRSCHEN DER FREIHEIT

In the Introduction, conscience is defined as a psychic reaction which judges the rightness or wrongness of a deed according to a set of accepted rules and customs. In Western society, these rules and customs, it was argued, are seen as coming from two possible sources. Either they originate in the mind of man, or they are perceived as coming from some extra-terrestrial entity, which is responsible as well for man's existence.

The history of modern man is inseparably linked with the re-emergence of the view that man and not an outside entity is responsible for the conditions of man's existence and is the ultimate source of moral values. This developing perception has created a problem for modern man in that he has trouble reconciling that which he knows with that which custom and tradition have taught him is correct. In this case, in Western society, the prevailing view has been that the Christian god was the source of all life and that man was his earthly incarnation. The locus of human existence was not believed to be in man the creature, but in God the divine spirit. In modern times, beginning with the Renaissance, this view was upset by free thinkers who exercised innate intellectual powers and challenged the religious viewpoint. Whereas medieval man found purpose and meaning of life in subjugating himself to God, the perceived center of human life, the new thinkers of the Renaissance argued that the intellect of man gives him the power to question this perception and decide through reason where human life really is centered.



Precisely this question concerns Andersch in his first novel Die Kirschen der Freiheit. He says, "Mein Buch hat lediglich die Aufgabe, darzustellen, dass ich, einem unsichtbaren Kurs folgend, in einem bestimmten Augenblick die Tat gewählt habe, die meinem Leben Sinn verlieh und von da an zur Achse wurde, um die sich das Rad meines Seins dreht."<sup>8</sup> In other words, it is the story of Andersch's own struggle with and resolution of the problem of finding the center of one's life. As argued in the Introduction, in this center are the values on which the conscience bases its judgement. How then does Andersch's conscience develop and what does he tell us by relating the development of his conscience? Several incidents are presented as milestones in the growth of his conscience.

As a child Andersch witnesses the procession of an execution squad during the revolution of 1918-1919. He says of this, "Weiss noch, dass mich dann am meisten interessierte, zu erfahren, wie es einem zumute war, der einen anderen erschiessen sollte. Nicht im Zorn, sondern der mit ihm eine lange Vorstadtsstrasse im dunklen Frühling entlangging, hatte Zeit zu denken, dass er am Ende der Strasse dem anderen das Leben auslöschen würde. So lange hält Zorn nicht vor. Was währt denn schon eine Strasse lang? Die Dummheit sich im Recht zu glauben? Der Befehl? Die Hetze? Der verwirrte Geist, der in anderen nur noch Gesindel sieht? Oder das gefällte Gewehr, das zur Entladung drängt? Der Blick, der sich schon den zusammenbrechenden Körper auf die Netzhaut zeichnet?"<sup>9</sup>

Andersch relates this incident because it shows his early confrontation with irrational acts of men. He asks simple questions. Why do men engage in such activities? What can possibly explain such



behavior; anger, stupidity, orders, irrationality? Do men view themselves as victims of circumstance, slaves of rules and conventions, or as beings capable of initiating and regulating their own behavior? These rather mundane questions are sharpened by the dramatic incident in which they are related.

Andersch's reaction to the incident betrays his adult view on the questions he poses. He says, "Versteh jedenfalls nicht, warum der mit dem Gewehr nicht stehenbleibt, sich eine Zigarette anzündet und in den zwei Sekunden, die das Glimmen des Streichholzes dauert, dem nächsten, der mit erhobenen Händen darauf wartet, dass der Marsch in den Tod das Ziel erreicht, zuflüstert: 'Da drüben - die Strasse, in den ersten Hausgang! Hau ab!'"<sup>10</sup>

The soldier with the gun could have let the prisoner escape. Why doesn't he do that? To what does he owe his allegiance or loyalty that prevents him from saving a life rather than taking a life? How is it possible to explain such human behavior? Andersch offers no answer, because such human behavior remains inexplicable. However, he does demonstrate that such basic questions occupied his attention even as a young child.

To discover the true nature of things was, therefore, an early desire of Andersch's. This desire found no fulfillment in school. He admits that he was a poor student, not because of lack of ability, but because of lack of opportunity. Of his instructors he says, "Sie hätten besser daran getan, einzusehen, dass ich überhaupt nichts 'lernen' wollte; was ich wollte, war: schauen, fühlen und begreifen."<sup>11</sup> Formal education stifled these natural impulses.

Religion, as well, offered no answers to young Andersch. He says,





"Nicht einmal als Pfarrer Johannes Kreppel mir die Oblate auf die Zunge legte und den Kelch an die Lippen hob, bin ich über die reine Mechanik der Handlung hinausgekommen."<sup>12</sup> Andersch is unable to relate to the rituals of the Church because they are so far removed from the life he has experienced. What purpose is served by distracting the attention of man to a metaphysical being? How can such activity answer the questions Andersch poses as a child? For example, what could explain the behavior of the soldier with the gun? To say that the man is under the influence of some evil spirit is to absolve him of any responsibility. If evil spirits are the source of evil acts, men have no responsibility at all in committing evil acts. How can they then be held accountable for what they do? Is not punishment for a crime misdirected when a criminal is jailed? Should not the evil spirit be incarcerated? Is it not absurd to maintain that good and evil spirits battle for the mind of man? Why should man prefer good to evil? What is wrong with preferring evil to good? If they could talk, it seems certain that the good and evil spirits would each profess their own viability. Who is the ultimate judge of what is good and what is evil? Is not man himself the one who chooses between the two, who decides ultimately what is good and what is evil? Does not man set the standards for conduct? Once that is realized and admitted, what further use is the talk about spirits and gods? Are they not the creations of man's mind, representations of the values which man through intellect has developed?

This is the conclusion Andersch reaches in his intellectual confrontation with the Church and its rituals. The Church and its rituals are products of human intelligence, not sources of our intellectual ability. The center of man is his reason. This is the



important lesson Andersch takes from his early life and from his experiences with the Church. "...ich glaubte, dass man den Menschen durch rationale Willensakte ändern und so die Welt verbessern könne."<sup>13</sup> This conviction that man through reason can create a better world is the motivating factor behind Andersch's decision to join the Communist Party. The Party is perceived as a means whereby Andersch can transform his insights about humans into meaningful action. His youthful enthusiasm for the Party is almost contagious. "Mein Tastsinn war es, der sich spannte; meine Nerven fühlten das faszinierend Unheimliche einer neuen, realistischen Scholastik, die sich mit dem Geist der Revolution verband."<sup>14</sup>

Andersch's youthful enthusiasm for the Party and the chance it promised him to realize his insights into man's true reasonable nature allowed him to overlook the fact that the Party was as guilty as the Church in demanding total subjugation to a doctrine which attempts to influence human behavior from the outside. It is almost too late before Andersch realizes that he has been misled by the Party. "Wir waren die Opfer einer deterministischen Philosophie geworden, welche die Freiheit des Willens leugnete. Wir redeten andauernd über die Massenbasis, die uns fehlte, ohne zu erkennen, dass uns die Arbeiter gefolgt wären, wenn wir uns zur Tat entschlossen hätten."<sup>15</sup>

This statement expresses two things. The first is Andersch's disappointment with the Party. This disappointment arises from the recognition that the Party is not an organization based on the premise that men through reason should freely question the basis of their existence. Rather, it attempts to force one view on all minds. The view is incorporated in a political doctrine which is deterministic



in nature and which is therefore perceived as being as immutable as the dogma of religion. The doctrine does not tolerate individual thought and questions. It views human life as directed by political and theoretical considerations and not by reason and humanity. Again, as in the Church, individual motivation, individual will, and therefore individual freedom are suppressed in favor of a one-sided view which attempts to define life in narrow terms. Such a dogma inhibits free thought and restricts man's highest calling, to question and attempt to comprehend the enormous variety and complexity of life on earth.

The second aspect of the above statement leads us into the other major topic about which Andersch writes. By subjugating themselves to a theoretical doctrine, Andersch and his Party comrades relinquish the ability to act on their own behalf. The point here is that Andersch recognizes that true freedom for man exists when man can act for something, not in perceiving one's self as becoming free from something. This statement is Andersch's recognition that he surrendered his freedom to act when he joined the Party, even though he imagined that by joining the Party he could work for the betterment of mankind. As he ruefully discovers, adherence to and practice of a political doctrine does not necessarily lead to improvement in the condition of man, regardless how enlightened the doctrine may appear. Inevitably the interests of the doctrine supersede those of the people it ostensibly serves.

An early lesson in the danger of subjugating one's self to a political doctrine should have been provided by the experience of Andersch's dying father. "In seiner tiefen Ohnmacht lag er sehr still, und die Trauer seines Gesichts war auf einmal zur Ruhe gekommen;





in der Erschöpfung enthüllte das Haupt aus gelbem Wachs eine Menschen-Natur, die sich aus Selbstlosigkeit einer politischen Idee verschrieben hatte und daran zugrunde ging."<sup>16</sup> Andersch's father had subjugated his personal life to a political doctrine to such an extent that when the doctrine failed, so did he. The example is extreme, but from it we learn of Andersch's subsequent view of the danger of seeking direction in life from political dogma.

Andersch implies the question, what purpose is served by believing that a political doctrine can direct human life? His implied answer is that no good purpose is served. The experience of his father is a lesson in the danger of subjugating one's self to a political doctrine. It is a lesson, however, which Andersch learns tardily.

Andersch witnesses the effects of subjugation of freedom and individuality to an outside entity or doctrine not only in his father, but among the soldiers with whom he serves on the front line. "Die meisten deutschen Soldaten bewegten sich in diesem Kriege nicht wie Träumer, auch nicht wie Betrunkene, sondern wie Gebannte; wer unter der Gewalt des bösen Blickes steht, sieht nicht mehr Iris und Pupille des Hypnotiseurs. Sein Bewusstsein ist ausgeschaltet, er fühlt noch den Bann, ohne nach seinen Gründen zu fragen."<sup>17</sup>

Andersch's diagnosis of the mental disposition of the soldiers is applicable to the general population as well. The willingness of people to surrender individual rights to figures of authority can only lead to disaster. By passively and uncritically accepting what the outside authority tells them, they lose the ability to make decisions on their own behalf and they allow themselves to be manipulated. Most distressing, as Andersch points out, is the loss



of critical evaluation. Once one has surrendered all and has come under the spell of the outside authority, one is no longer capable of recognizing the authority as good or bad. One's destiny is also no longer under one's own control. The willingness with which people give up control of their own lives, even as popular sentiment constantly calls for increased freedom of choice, is one of the great ironies of human life. Here, Andersch once again demonstrates his point in regard to the folly of seeking guidance from outside sources.

Andersch correctly saw his duty as a young man to work for the good of mankind, to further understanding among men. "...mit der Schnelligkeit jähren Begreifens vollzog ich den Übertritt von den nationalistischen Doktrinen meines Vaters zu den Gedanken des Sozialismus, der Menschenliebe, der Befreiung der Unterdrückten, der Internationale und des militanten Defaitismus."<sup>18</sup> Unfortunately, however, Andersch chose the wrong means to realize his laudable ambitions. He had obtained the proper perspective on life, but in subjugating himself to a political doctrine, he compromised his ability to act on the insights his perspective gave him. The recognition that he had erred came as a great shock to Andersch. The situation was exacerbated by the fact that his flirtation with the Party occurred during Germany's Fascist regime. What normally would have been the common awakening by an adolescent to the realities of life was for Andersch a dangerous situation in which his life was seriously threatened. The experience, however, provides the source from which come the ideas for his subsequent novels.

Thus far it has been argued that one aspect of Die Kirschen der Freiheit deals with Andersch's attempts to gain a proper perspective



on values and conscience, to discover what is true and what merely has the appearance of truth. Through exposure to the Church and the Communist Party, two organizations which view life as directed from outside sources and both of which fail to advance modern man through these views, Andersch became convinced that moral direction for man must come from within man and that it is man's duty to encourage growth based on this perception. How then does Andersch actually view this "inside of man"?

Part of the answer is found in Andersch's stated view in regard to the worth of man. "Der Wert des Menschen besteht darin, dass er Mut und Angst, Vernunft und Leidenschaft nicht als feindliche Gegensätze begreift, die er zerstören muss, sondern als Pole des einen Spannungsfeldes, das er selber ist."<sup>19</sup> Andersch sees man as composed of contrasting elements. The interplay between these elements is the source of man's vitality, the source of his humanness.

Andersch suggests that in order for man to remain human and vital, these contrasts must be allowed and even encouraged to react with one another. Political or religious doctrines seek to suppress certain of these elements in favor of others. Thus, they render their adherents something less than "human" as Andersch defines the term here.

For Andersch personally, the most consequential struggle between conflicting elements took place during the Second World War. "Ich war derart auf den Hund gekommen, dass ich einen deutschen Sieg für möglich hielt. Ich gab damals der Kanalaratte eine Chance. Jedesmal, wenn ich daran denke, spucke ich innerlich vor mir aus. Aber ich hatte wenigstens noch den Riecher, die Angst in mir festzuhalten. Hätte ich sie überwunden und zerstört, hätte ich den Mut über sie triumphieren





lassen, so wäre ich stumpf geworden, was die Kanalratte aus mir zu machen gewillt war. Über die Jahre des Krieges hinweg, die dann folgten, habe ich nicht nur den Mut, sondern auch die Angst gerettet, bis zu den Tagen, an denen ich meine Flucht wagte. Niemals hätte ich den Mut zur Flucht aufgebracht, wenn ich nicht in der gleichen Masse, in der ich mutig war, feige gewesen wäre."<sup>20</sup>

For Andersch it was extremely important that he keep all conflicting emotions and passions in equilibrium. Because he does not give in totally to one passion or desire, he is free to act for the benefit of his combined interests. Andersch recognizes this fact as the real source of freedom for the individual. In this context, Livia Wittman's statement applies in regard to the central idea of the book. "Wie ist es möglich, unter allen Umständen, sich die individuelle Freiheit zu bewahren?"<sup>21</sup>

How has Andersch dealt with this question of freedom? The preceding discussion has shown that an understanding of the factors which constitute the individual psyche must precede the question of preserving freedom. As Andersch notes, the individual is composed of a number of conflicting elements, among them courage, fear, reason, and passion. They all contend for the individual's complete attention. Andersch maintains that a decision dictated solely by one's emotion is not a free decision. The practical example he offers is the story of his involvement with the Communist Party.

The Party promulgated a particular political doctrine. The essence of any doctrine is to favor certain qualities or facts at the expense of others. Its adherents accept the view of the doctrine to the exclusion of other viewpoints. Adherence to such a doctrine therefore



limits the perception of the individual. When the individual makes a decision or when a decision is required, the direction of the decision is pre-determined by the doctrine. The individual does not act as a free agent but as an agent of the doctrine. A truly free individual would not allow him- or herself to become limited by a particular doctrine.

In order to maintain the distance required to avoid becoming limited by a particular viewpoint, an individual must maintain an equilibrium among the competing elements and needs of the psyche. As pointed out earlier, Andersch failed to do this when he became involved with the Communist Party. He subjugated himself to Party doctrine and relinquished his freedom. Because of the political circumstances at that time, the consequences of his decision were almost fatal.

His decision to desert the Army arises from a more balanced perception. Rather than take his cue from outside rules, he completely ignores the oath of allegiance he delivered during his forced induction into the army and relies on his inner convictions. Those convictions are based on human values and not on religious and political credos. Andersch was not swayed by passions engendered by adherence to a particular doctrine. He maintained the ability to make a balanced decision. He knew what the correct course of action was, and it remained for him to act on his conviction.

The act of desertion was also the concrete expression of his freedom as an individual. Proof of freedom exists when one acts freely. "Ich hatte mich entschlossen, rüber zu gehen, weil ich den Akt der Freiheit vollziehen wollte, der zwischen der Gefangenschaft aus der



ich kam, und derjenigen, in die ich ging, im Niemandsland lag. Ich wollte rüber, weil ich mir damit aufs neue das Recht erwarb, Bedingungen stellen zu können, auf die ich mir schon in der Vergangenheit einen Anspruch erworben hatte, ich wollte diesen fast verjährten Anspruch erneuern."<sup>22</sup>

In this regard Andersch's act of freedom represents a most creative act. He exercises the ability to do something. As the above statement illustrates, he does not perceive that act as a measure to free himself from the German army or the oppression of a totalitarian state. He confesses that he will merely exchange one form of incarceration for the other. The importance lies in the act itself, for Andersch acts freely, unimpeded by doctrine or dogma. He does not seek nor does he proffer traditional moral justifications. His own conscience is at rest because the act is based on the values he perceives to be true. Those values are drawn from the basic shared values of humanity which transcend the strictures of religion and politics.

A summary of this chapter must begin with the first statement quoted from Andersch. He says the book is an attempt to illustrate the background to the act which gives meaning to his life. The book serves the dual purpose of explaining the act and justifying it. His approach is in line with the true nature of man's behavior. "Zuerst war das Bedürfnis des Menschen, sich auf irgendeine Weise menschlich, das heisst anders als Schimpansen oder Ameisen zu verhalten, und dann erst trieb es ihn auf die Motivsuche, nach solcher Verhaltensweise."<sup>23</sup> The explanations for man's motivations are traditionally codified in religions or, for modern man, in political





and economic ideologies. These codifications take on a separate embodiment and are perceived as ends in themselves, as loci from which man receives direction in life.

For Andersch it is important that the correct perception of such mental constructs be maintained. The human act precedes the attempt to justify it. Whatever philosophical or moral meaning man gives that act comes from man as well and not from an outside entity. For Andersch there is no god in the Christian sense who stands in judgement over human actions. He is a creation of man's need to provide explanations for actions already taken.

The importance of Andersch's book is that Andersch does not indulge in mystical or metaphysical tangents to explain the action he took in deserting the German army. He finds a great deal of strength and meaning in the recognition that his act is motivated by strictly human considerations. Andersch wants to save his own life and preserve for himself the ability to choose the course his life should take. In order to preserve this ability, Andersch recognizes that he can not surrender or subjugate himself to a restrictive religious or political dogma. Such a surrender would limit his freedom and impinge his ability to act for his own interests.

Andersch's rejection of religious and political dogma does not become a source of despair. He does not feel that by rejecting these beliefs and the institutions which they spawn that he abandons any responsible means by which his actions can be directed or comprehended. His rejection of these mental constructs as immutable facts means that he recognizes man himself as their source. It is his belief that, ultimately, man must turn to himself in order to find the answers to



the questions which come to him as a result of his intellect. Religious and political credos can be of some help in this regard. However, again, they are merely expressions of man's attempts to come to terms with his existence. They are not entities in their own right. It can be argued that religious and political institutions have helped man progress, but it must also be recognized that such progress has been hindered historically by numerous regressions in the form of war and persecution inspired by church and political institutions.

Andersch's book suggests that in order to answer questions about values and conscience, it is better to circumvent the distractive overlays of religion and politics and go directly to the heart of the matter, which is man himself and his complex nature. As Andersch says, man's nature is composed of contrasting elements. The tension between these elements is the source of man's vitality, creativity, and humanity. It is the characteristic which sets him apart from other creatures. Any attempt to suppress one element in favor of another upsets the natural balance between them and results in extremes of human behavior. Free men will not arbitrarily restrict any of these elements. They will allow each to function as long as possible, in order to ascertain its true nature, without allowing it to initiate extreme action which would upset the other balancing forces. In this manner free men retain their freedom. They choose those courses of action which maintain the tension between the various extremes of their character.

Andersch's first novel is the story of how he came to take totally free action. There are no mystical or metaphysical roots to his action. Andersch recognizes the contrasting elements of human nature and he acts to maintain the conditions under which these contrasting elements can be



kept alive. He thereby retains his humanity and gives an example of humanistically based conscience.





## CHAPTER II - SANSIBAR ODER DER LETZTE GRUND

In Sansibar oder der letzte Grund Andersch introduces three archetypes which he continues in succeeding novels. The archetypes are represented by the characters Knudsen, Gregor, and Helander. Each corresponds to a particular viewpoint in regard to the true origin of values and conscience. In this chapter, each archetype will be examined in order to illuminate those viewpoints further.

Knudsen is an example of one man who relishes action, who enjoys getting things done, but who willingly cripples himself by surrendering his freedom to an abstract political doctrine. The doctrine here is Communism. From the outset it is clear that Knudsen does not like the Communist Party organization. He is plagued by "seinen Hass gegen die Partei, weil sie versagt hatte."<sup>24</sup> He has no quarrel with party doctrine, however, and allows his life to be manipulated by that doctrine.

Knudsen is a complex character who embodies contrasting elements. On the one hand he favors independent action; the prospect of saving the statue is an enticing possibility for resistance to the Nazis. "Jetzt bin ich der Fisch, dachte Knudsen, der Fisch vor der Angel. Ich kann anbeissen oder nicht.... Aber auf diesen Köder habe ich mein leben lang angebissen, entsann er sich. Und immer hat der Haken weh getan. Aber immer hat er mich in die Luft gerissen, in der man die Schreie der Fische hören konnte. Verdammt will ich sein, dachte Knudsen voller Wut, wenn ich ein stummer Fisch sein soll."<sup>25</sup> Knudsen is predisposed to act when confronted with the possibility of active



resistance against the Nazis. There are, however, two constraints on his inclination. One is his mentally ill wife whom he loves very much and who would be placed in jeopardy if he were to act. The other constraint is imposed by his own perceived need to adhere to outside direction. Because the Party does not condone acts of resistance and because Knudsen still professes loyalty to the Party, it is initially impossible for him to act according to his true instincts.

Knudsen realizes that his own instincts are correct and that if he were to follow them he would lead the life most suited to his needs. But he is unable to accept the direction which comes from within. Even though he is capable of making choices on his own and of acting on his own, he refuses to do so. He does not trust himself to make the right decision.

When he finally acts to save Judith and the statue, he does so not because he acts on the strength of inner conviction, but because he feels compelled to do so by Gregor. "Wenn die Partei schon im Eimer ist, dann müssen die Jungen kneifen wie er, und die Älteren so wie ich. Dann ist es besser, wir machen solche Sachen, wie die, zu der er mich heute gezwungen hat, Sachen ohne die Partei, private Sachen."<sup>26</sup>

This statement reveals two things about Knudsen. First, he confesses that the Party is no longer of any use. As an organization it has failed in Knudsen's eyes to offer resistance to the Nazis. This could be a source of liberation for Knudsen. He no longer feels bound by Party codes and can offer the resistance he feels is appropriate. Yet, and this is the second point, Knudsen refuses to recognize that he can now operate as a free agent. Even though he says that in the face



of the Party's collapse it is better that he and Gregor carry out private acts of resistance, the perception that Gregor forces him to do this betrays Knudsen's inability to recognize or accept that the impulses for the action come from within himself. Unless an impulse is sanctioned by an outside entity which makes a claim to authority, Knudsen is unwilling to recognize the validity of that impulse.

This passage clearly illustrates the problematical nature of Knudsen. Even though he is presented with the opportunity to act freely on his own laudable ambitions, he refuses to take the opportunity; he refuses to recognize his own worth in acting as an individual. He is incapable of acting until some outside authority bids him to act on his instincts. Knudsen serves as an archetype of one who constantly needs reinforcement by an outside entity before initiating action which he knows is good and correct. He is fearful of his own individuality. He finds security only in the masses or in a large organization where he can relinquish his individuality.

For this reason it is difficult for Gregor to prod Knudsen into action, even though Knudsen admits to himself that he would rather act than remain a mute fish for the rest of his life. Only when Knudsen feels forced into action, only when he is able to transfer the perceived locus of the impulse from the Party to Gregor, is he able to rescue Judith and the statue. The irony of Knudsen's character is that he willingly transfers his own ideals and ambitions to outside entities, to which he then looks for guidance. One is tempted to suggest that it would be far healthier for Knudsen to simply recognize that he is the source of these impulses and that outside sanctions are not necessary. Indeed, the lesson from his association with the Party





is that by surrendering his individuality to the Party, he leaves himself open to manipulation by the Party.

Knudsen will always perceive the real locus of impulses and desires as outside of himself. He will always require direction from some authority before he takes any action. His apparently individual act in rescuing Judith and the statue is illusory. The Party's doctrine retains his ultimate loyalty. "Er hat die Fahne heruntergeholt, aber er hat sie sorgfältig zusammengefaltet und in seinen Schrank gelegt, anstatt vor ihr zu fliehen. Überwintern will er mit ihr, weil er nicht weiss, dass Flaggen, die man gestrichen hat, nie wieder flattern werden wie ehemals. Natürlich gibt es Fahnen, die nach einer Niederlage glorreich wieder auferstehen. Aber es gibt keine Fahnen, die man in Schränke legen und wieder hervorholen kann, deswegen werden die Fahnen, die man hissen wird, wenn die anderen einmal nicht mehr herrschen werden, keine glorreichen Banner sein, sondern gefärbte Leinwandstücke, die man wieder erlaubt hat. Wir werden in einer Welt leben, dachte Gregor, in der alle Fahnen gestorben sein werden. Irgendwann später, sehr lange Zeit darnach, wird es vielleicht neue Fahnen geben, echte Fahnen, aber ich bin mir nicht sicher, dachte er, ob es nicht besser wäre, wenn es überhaupt keine mehr gäbe. Kann man in einer Welt leben, in der die Flaggenmasten leer stehen?"<sup>27</sup>

Gregor's statement applies not only to Knudsen's situation but to the general situation of man. His question, "Kann man in einer Welt leben, in der die Flaggenmasten leer stehen?" might be rephrased to ask, can it ever be possible for one to live in a world where outside symbols of authority and outside verifications are not necessary, a world in which the real locus of man's desires and impulses is



recognized as in man himself? Knudsen is presented as an example of one who surrenders his locus to a political ideology and thereby leaves himself open to manipulation and finally betrayal by that ideology. Why not dispense with the ideology, the flags, the symbols, asks Gregor, and address real human needs and desires?

Gregor of course is the archetype of one who eschews party doctrine and remains an individual. Unlike Knudsen, Gregor's disaffection with the Party stems from a disagreement over philosophy and not organization. He no longer accepts the Party's deterministic philosophy; Gregor views himself as an individual responsible for his own actions. As he approaches Rerik, Gregor reflects on the source of his disaffection with the Party. "Im Anblick Reriks erinnerte Gregor sich an Taraskova, weil dort sein Verrat begonnen hatte. Der Verrat hatte darin bestanden, dass ihm als einzigem der goldene Schild wichtiger gewesen war als die Einnahme der Stadt."<sup>28</sup> Taraskova was the object of a military exercise in which Gregor participated while training with the Party in the Soviet Union. The golden shield is a metaphor for the cloud of smoke and dust which hovered above the distant city. From Gregor's vantage point the slanting rays of sunshine imbue the flat cloud with a golden patina, hence the reference to a golden shield. Gregor's aesthetic, even romantic, vision of the city clashes with the purely tactical and strategic considerations of his comrades. They are interested in the city because it is the object of their military quest. Gregor, on the other hand, does not even consider the town in this manner. He views the town with aesthetic appreciation. His view is fundamentally different from that of his comrades and it sets him apart from them. It is a first indication to



himself that he thinks differently than what is required of him. He thinks independently of the Party, as an individual. "Die Genossen im Zentralkomitee waren nicht mit ihm zufrieden. Sie fanden, er sei flau geworden."<sup>29</sup>

Gregor considers himself to be a victim of the Party's deterministic philosophy. The recognition of this fact leads Gregor to assert his own will. He drops the tenets of party ideology and acts on his own beliefs. The initial effect is almost exhilarating. "Sowie man die Partei im Stich lässt, gibt es wieder Romantik, dachte Gregor."<sup>30</sup> Long dormant emotions are released which allows Gregor to be attracted to Judith. The theoretical prospect of acting outside of the Party organization also becomes practical.

The object which serves as a catalyst to this change on the part of Gregor is the wooden figure. Gregor feels an intense affinity for the statue. "Genauso sind wir in der Lenin-Akademie gesessen und genauso haben wir gelesen, gelesen, gelesen. Er ist wir."<sup>31</sup> Although seemingly alike in this regard, an important difference exists between Gregor and the statue. "Er sieht aus wie einer, der jederzeit das Buch zuklappen kann und aufstehen, um etwas ganz anderes zu tun."<sup>32</sup> In his pre-transformed state Gregor is unable to comprehend this apparent attitude. For example, if the figure is a representation of a young monk reading the Bible, how can it profess to be a monk without totally believing in the scripture it reads? Gregor asks further, how is it possible "Nach den Regeln leben, ohne den Geist zu binden?"<sup>33</sup> For Gregor the answer to this question brings startling implications for his own situation. The small figure is a free thinker who is not ideologically bound. He reads critically, without





ideological blinders. He is prepared to live a life directed from within rather than from without.

Gregor is moved by this realization. He confesses, "Ich habe einen gesehen, der ohne Auftrag lebt. Einen, der lesen kann und dennoch stehen und fortgehen."<sup>34</sup> Gregor is envious of the figure. His envy is understandable. Until now he has accepted all the assignments the Party has given him. He has been gullible and has allowed his life to be directed by the Party. He has not been honest with himself nor admitted to himself that he would rather live without orders from someone else. When he sees self-conviction so clearly represented in the small figure, he is inspired to seek that quality in himself. As a result, he gains courage to act according to his own convictions.

These convictions are based on a personal ethical standard which has no basis in religion or politics. "Hätte ich sagen sollen, dachte er, Sie täuschen sich, ich bin kein Christ, ich bin Kommunist? Es hätte nicht gestimmt, denn ich bin kein Kommunist mehr, ich bin ein Deserteur. Ich bin auch kein Deserteur, sondern ein Mann, der begrenzte kleine Aktionen durchführt, im eigenen Auftrag."<sup>35</sup> One of these acts is the saving of the statue. The other is his rescue of Judith.

Gregor's motive for saving Judith is twofold. Firstly, she is in great danger and needs help. Gregor recognizes this and is in a position to give her the help she needs. He thus responds to the humanistic principles which now guide his life. Secondly, it is a means of offering active resistance to the Nazis.

On another level, Judith serves as a contrast to Gregor's first



love, Anna. Gregor feels guilty because he was unable to rescue her from banishment from the Party. Now he is in a position where he can rescue a young woman and absolve the guilt he feels in regard to Anna and the guilt that results from his association with the Party.

"Ich habe alles falsch gemacht, sagte er. Nein, erwiderte Judith, Sie retten mich doch. Das ist zu wenig, dachte Gregor: man kann alles richtig machen und dabei das Wichtigste versäumen."<sup>36</sup> Gregor's thoughts have a double meaning. In the context of his relationship with Judith, he is saving Judith's life but losing her love. She is leaving and he is embarking on a career of active resistance to the Nazis. In a larger context, the remarks accurately describe Gregor's life. According to Party ideology he has done everything correctly until now. Yet he has missed the important things in life: sense of personal fulfillment, love for another person, acting in accord with personal beliefs. None of these come if one subjects one's self to a philosophy or ideology which denies the freedom of individual will.

Whereas Knudsen is the archetype of one who subjugates his will to a political doctrine and whereas Gregor succeeds in maintaining his individuality by rejecting that doctrine, Pastor Helander is an example of one who surrenders his own will to religious doctrine. He, as Knudsen, feels that he can not exist on the strength of his own convictions. He needs the sanctions of an outside authority. He can not, with good conscience, initiate any action unless that action is approved by this authority, in this case the Church. His own interests are so intertwined with those of the Church that when the Church fails, Helander feels that he has failed as well.

In contrast to the other characters, his situation is totally



without hope. Knudsen believes the Party flag has been furled for the moment and that one day it will be unrolled again. He can continue to live because he believes that the authority to which he feels he must submit will one day re-establish itself. Gregor fares much better because he rejects party ideology and achieves a sense of true identity through his private actions against the Nazis. For Helander, however, there is no alternative after the Church. He knows the Church is a failed institution, one which does not even interest the Nazis, who are ever aware of threats to their presumption to authority.

"Den mächtigen Christus auf dem Altar lassen sie in Ruhe, sein kleiner Schüler ist es, der sie stört."<sup>37</sup> Free thinkers, as represented by the statue and by Gregor, are of more interest to the authorities.

Helander's instinctive urge to save the statue from desecration finds no support from the Church as an organization. Without the authority of the Church to support him, Helander has nowhere to turn but to himself. He is daunted by this new challenge. "Es ist absurd, wegen einer kleinen leblosen Holzfigur, so allein zu sein, wie ich morgen früh allein sein werde, morgen früh, wenn die anderen kommen."<sup>38</sup> Helander must now contend with the fact that he is acting alone, without the support of the Church on which he has relied so long. Faced with such an unaccustomed situation, Helander panics and hastily considers his options. He can try to escape and save his life, for he is in mortal danger. Or he can remain and confront the authorities when they arrive to confiscate the now missing statue.

Both options are problematical for Helander. Escape from Rerik would entail everlasting acknowledgement that the Church has failed. Helander would have to live with this knowledge and face the fact as





well that he wasted most of his life in service to the Church. Remaining in Rerik means that Helander has to endure interrogation and torture at the hands of the authorities.

Both choices are unacceptable to Helander. His spirit is not strong enough for him to live a life without the direction provided by the outside authority of the Church. A painful death at the hands of the Nazis is physically unacceptable. Helander could console himself with the prospect of martyrhood, but as he no longer believes in the Church, this alternative is impossible. "Weder Gott noch der Klosterschüler konnten von ihm verlangen, dass er seinen Körper den Peitschen oder Gummischläuchen den anderen aussetzte."<sup>39</sup>

By killing himself and some of the authorities, Helander proves that he is unable to live life without the crutch of the Church to support him. For Helander, the prospect of living a life directed from within is unacceptable. He has been totally dependent on the Church for moral guidance. The guiding force in his life has come from without. When he perceives that force has failed, he must look inward for alternative direction. His instinctive action to save the statue is an indication that he can initiate independent action and thought. However, Helander lacks the courage to rely on himself. Without the Church behind him, he perceives that he is totally alone in the world. He does not consider looking to other men for help. His whole life has been dedicated to the notion that men are influenced by the devil and that God is the one good thing in life. When he finally realizes that his god is a sham, death is perceived as the only alternative to a life which can no longer rely on direction from an outside entity.





Helander's story represents one of Andersch's harshest criticisms of the Church and the effect its dogma has on man's will. In Andersch's view, religious dogma renders man unable to act when confronted with conditions of social or political injustice. An example is Helander's attitude toward the Nazis before he realizes the total failure of the Church. "Wie hatte er sich bisher den Sieg der anderen erklärt? Sehr einfach - Gott war abwesend, er lebte in der grössten überhaupt denkbaren Ferne, und die Welt war das Reich des Satans."<sup>40</sup>

Helander separates the evil produced by the Nazis from the Nazis themselves. His explanation for their victory is that an evil embodied in an invisible Satan has temporarily taken over the world. The Nazis are mere tools of this evil spirit and not propagators of unjust deeds. Such a perception in regard to the source of evil necessarily creates problems when trying to combat the evil. If the Nazis are mere agents, resistance to them will not affect the ultimate source of evil. The evil will continue, only it will take some other form. According to this scenario, only God can fight the ultimate source of evil. When He prevails men bask in the glories of his victories. When He suffers reverses, as exemplified by the rise of the Nazis, men suffer as a consequence. By sharing this perception, Christian believers are incapable of dealing directly with the temporal manifestations of evil. As a consequence, their profound faith in God is of no help in curbing such unjust ideologies as Fascism.

Helander is a church man who finally comes to this realization. He realizes that his faith has robbed him of the ability to combat the Nazis. They are not personifications of the devil nor are they agents of some other sinister spiritual power. They are the source



of evil and perpetrators of unjust and inhuman deeds. They can not be opposed by mere reliance on faith. Faith in spiritual deities only distorts perception of the true source of evil.

Helander's decision to resist the Nazis by saving the statue is recognition of this fact. The tragedy of his situation, however, is that once he realizes the true source of evil and that the means to combat this evil reside in man, he is unable to offer further resistance. His faith has made him weak. When it is gone he finds he does not have the inner strength required to counter human evil. Death offers the only escape from this predicament.

The extent to which Helander recognizes the sham of the Church is expressed in the statement, "Doktor Frerking war ein guter Arzt - er konnte Zaubersprüche so vorbringen, dass man sie ihm glaubte. Ein guter Pfarrer tat nichts anderes. Auf die Wahrheiten der Medizin und der Religion kam es schon lange nicht mehr an; was man von den Ärzten und Pfarrern hören wollte, waren Zaubersprüche, Beschwörungsformeln."<sup>41</sup>

This is Andersch's statement on how pathetically dependent many people are on the distractive dogma of the Church. Such people are unwilling and unable to accept that evil men are the source of evil deeds and that to combat this evil one must combat these men. There is no magic formula which can unilaterally wipe out evil. Real deliverance will not come through attempts to divorce human evil from its propagators and relegate it to a metaphysical level where imaginary spirits battle in the stead of mankind. This is the main message Andersch conveys through the character Helander.

This message is a part of Andersch's apparent conviction that man is doomed to fail whenever he puts his faith in religious and political



dogma. Even though these are products of man's intellect, once created, they achieve an aura of permanence and immutability which inhibits man's dynamic nature and which creates feelings of guilt or unworth where such feelings are unwarranted. To illustrate this point we again look at Knudsen. Because the Party does not sanction an act he knows is good and correct, Knudsen is plagued by emotions which question the motivations which arise from his own sense of values. He is dependent on an outside source of authority and cannot surrender his dependency. As noted earlier, he acts only when he convinces himself that Gregor has temporarily become the source of outside authority and when he perceives that Gregor requires him to act in a manner which he knows inherently is correct. Knudsen recognizes the worth of his own motivations, but he is unable to act on them until some outside authority sanctions those motivations. He willingly hampers his own freedom to act.

Helander's situation is similar. His source of outside authority is the Church. The defeat of the Church, however, is not perceived as a temporary setback to be reversed in the future.

"Der protestantische Pfarrer Helander bezieht die extremste Position von den drei handelnden Personen. Sein Extremismus, der in den Tod mündet, scheint folgerichtig zu sein, denn ihm bleibt noch weniger Halt nach der Enttäuschung über das 'Versagen der Kirche' als Knudsen. Nicht einmal eine Illusion."<sup>42</sup> Knudsen and Helander are examples of people who fail because they do not have the will or courage to recognize their own worth as human beings. They must constantly seek reinforcement for their human motivations from some outside authority. This need for reinforcement leads to a dependency which in turn allows





Knudsen and Helander to be manipulated.

Gregor, on the other hand, is the prototype of an individual who strikes a balance between the need for outside reinforcement and the perception of the worth of his own values. He can agree with certain aspects of Party ideology, but he draws the line when the Party presumes to control all aspects of his thinking. He reserves for himself the right to choose the direction his life takes. His freedom to act does not impinge on the freedom of others. He acts as a free individual and his actions preserve his freedom. He also recognizes that the evil of Nazism can only be fought by combating the men of that organization.. His decision to save Judith and the statue and then join underground resistance forces are tangible proof of this conviction.

The model for Gregor is obviously Andersch himself. There exists a parallel development in their awareness of the limits imposed by religious and political doctrine on the freedom of the individual. Each undergoes a transformation of perceptions which involves renouncing previously held notions about humanity. For Andersch as well as for Gregor the most important task in life is to preserve the conditions under which free choice can take place. As the related stories of both point out, this is not an easy task. It requires that man take a great responsibility upon himself and recognize that control of his destiny really is in his own hands; that ultimately he is answerable only to himself. Men have always been afraid of this challenge because men are mercurial creatures upon which to depend. "Es wäre einfacher, dachte Gregor, vom Meer abhängig zu sein, statt von den Menschen."<sup>43</sup> Yet in the face of failure on the part of organized religious and political doctrine to provide suitable values



on which to base conscience, argues Andersch, it is imperative that men learn to rely on themselves for direction.

Again as in Die Kirschen der Freiheit, Andersch's main concern is to depict conditions and attitudes which dramatize the problem of making free choices. Knudsen and Helander sacrifice their free will to outside entities and become ineffective in dealing with human injustice. Gregor maintains his freedom and his individuality and remains capable of fighting the human source of evil. Andersch has faith that free-thinking men, unbound by ideology and dogma, are best equipped to deal with inhuman acts and choose the right course of action.



### CHAPTER III - DIE ROTE

In Die Rote Andersch departs from the archetypes he introduces in his previous novels. Only Fabio Crepaz bears a resemblance to the "geschlagener Revolutionär" represented by Andersch in Die Kirschen der Freiheit and by Gregor in Sansibar oder der letzte Grund. Fabio shares their disaffection, learned through experience, with Communist Party doctrine. He is also successful in finding a creative outlet, musical performance, for the sense of loss created by this disaffection.

The other main characters of Die Rote share none of these characteristics. A close examination of Franziska in particular reveals that she possesses few of the qualities which redeem Andersch, Fabio, and Gregor. She is an example of someone who runs away from responsibility. She creates a situation which becomes intolerable for her and then escapes the situation, without offering proof that she can correct her errant ways.

Her action results because there is no real center of values in her life. Her perceived source of values is rooted in an almost mystical belief in the ultimate triumph of good over evil. "Wir haben einen Traum gemeinsam, den deutschen Traum von der Sauberkeit um der Sauberkeit willen, von der abstrakten Sauberkeit, von der Welt, aus der aller Schmutz hinausgefegt worden ist, der böse Schmutz und der gute Schmutz, denn es gibt guten, wertvollen Schmutz, Schmutz, aus dem Leben steigt, aber wir träumen vom grossen deutschen Putztag jenseits von Gut und Böse, wir trachten nach der Reinlichkeit, statt nach der Reinheit."<sup>44</sup> This metaphysical belief is, however, of little use to



Franziska in dealing with the problems in her own life. She recognizes values in an abstract sense but fails to see their applicability to real situations.

This inability to establish a real source of values causes Franziska to act irresponsibly. She marries Herbert, for example, in order to spite Joachim for his indifference to her. Although she says she loved Joachim, it is difficult to believe she means it. If she really loved him, why would she try to hurt him by marrying Herbert? He is indifferent to her, but does his indifference provide her with just cause to spite him? Her drastic action is more than just a petulant reaction to Joachim's disinterest in her. There is malice in her desire to hurt Joachim. She is not interested in responsibly reconciling her feelings for him. Franziska's real feelings of hate for Joachim become the actual basis of her relationship with Herbert. "Ich habe es mit dir getan, weil ich Joachim hasse, ich habe es in den Augenblicken getan, in denen ich Joachim am meisten hasste."<sup>45</sup>

Because love is not the basis for her marriage with Herbert, Franziska's relationship with him is unfulfilling. Her continuing dalliance with Joachim is based on pure sexual gratification. "...ich tue es gern, mit einem richtigen Mann, einem zärtlich, erfahrenen, angenehmen Mann tue ich es sehr gerne. Ich lasse mich leicht verführen, wenn der Mann in Ordnung ist und wenn er es richtig anstellt...."<sup>46</sup> Joachim is a man "in Ordnung" according to Franziska. He is an entrepreneur, a man who enjoys the acquisition and exercise of power. Franziska is drawn to him because of the physical power he exudes. However, as already noted, when he spurns an emotional





attachment, she marries a man she doesn't love in order to spite him. She complicates her life by engaging in a triangle relationship with both men and allows it to endure for three years, even though the relationship does not provide her with emotional satisfaction.

When Franziska decides to depart for Venice, she does so not because she has been struck suddenly by the immorality of her relationship with both men. She leaves because it is a quick way out of the emotional dilemma in which she finds herself. The dilemma, however, is caused by Franziska's refusal to act responsibly. She falls prey to physical desire and feelings of revenge and she disregards the consequences. There are no moral values which guide her actions.

Had Franziska adhered to a set of values, it is unlikely that she would have entered a relationship as exists between her, Joachim, and Herbert. A set of values could also provide a means for ending such a relationship. Franziska could have abandoned her lover and reconciled herself with her husband. Or she could have obtained a divorce from her husband and still continued to see Joachim. "Scheidung....darüber habe ich gar nicht nachgedacht."<sup>47</sup> In order to take either of these steps, however, an admission of guilt or an act of contrition is necessary on the part of Franziska.

Instead of exercising a responsible alternative, Franziska leaves Herbert and Joachim entirely. She makes no attempt to resolve responsibly her relationship with them. She shows no guilt at the fact that she is the one who instigated the triangle relationship. Her action is consistent with the irresponsibility she demonstrates throughout her personal life. Her escape to Venice is little more



than an attempt to avoid facing the consequences of her relationship with the two men. She does not consider, for example, the emotional effect her departure will have on Herbert. "Was ich wollte war, ganz ruhig und still Schluss machen, aber statt dessen habe ich eine Szene gemacht, wir Weiber sind doch furchtbar, wir können es nicht lassen, aber obwohl es schief gegangen ist, muss ich jetzt Schluss machen, Schluss, Schluss, Schluss."<sup>48</sup>

Certainly Herbert and Joachim share in the blame for Franziska's predicament. They are hardly the most sympathetically portrayed characters. "Eine Frau ist ihnen etwas zum Ausruhen oder zur Repräsentation oder zur Perversion."<sup>49</sup> Franziska, however, has fit into this role rather neatly. By becoming Joachim's mistress and by being unfaithful to Herbert she practices extreme perversion herself.

Her complaint, "Sie haben immer nur ihre Beleuchtung auf mich projiziert, keiner hat mich erkannt"<sup>50</sup> is therefore rather weak. It is easy to project characterizations onto Franziska because she has so little character herself. Her subservience to Joachim's whims and her false attempt to function as Herbert's wife reveal her to be a quintessential "Anpassungsmensch", devoid of an effective conscience. As a consequence, Franziska is unable to take correct moral action on her own behalf. At one point she considers prostituting herself to men as an expedient means to earn money. Even she is surprised at how quickly this course of action becomes a viable alternative. "...sie war starr über sich selbst, als sie sich klar machte, was sie dachte, so schnell geht das also..."<sup>51</sup> She also considers escaping with O'Malley on his sailboat. She finally declines on the grounds, however, that "es würde an Zauberei grenzen, und darum stimmt irgend



etwas nicht, es gibt keine Zauberei, und wenn sie es gibt, so muss man dafür zahlen, allen Zauberern auf der Welt geht es darum, einen Aladin zu finden, der ihnen die Wunderlampe bringt...."<sup>52</sup> Her insight here is quite correct, yet Franziska learns nothing from it. Despite her correct assessment that there is no magic formula to life, she continues to seek a quick solution to her dilemma by remaining in Venice.

Franziska imagines Italy to be a place where she can begin a new life. Simple lower class houses attract her attention. "...ich habe mich immer nur für diese Art Häuser interessiert, ganz Italien besteht aus solchen Häusern, in denen die Leute abends im Dunklen sitzen und Geheimnisse bewahren...."<sup>53</sup> Here is continued evidence that Franziska lives in a dream world. She believes that behind the facades of these simple homes the inhabitants protect the secrets of a fulfilling life. Franziska imagines that if she can get behind one of those facades and become a party to the secrets, her life will undergo the change she longs for.

Her hope must be viewed as vain, however. There are no magic secrets behind shabby house fronts that can help her. It is doubtful that her chance meeting with Fabio Crepaz, which is the actualization of Franziska's dream of gaining entrance to one of these houses, will transform her life. Before she can embark on a new life with a new man, she must first reconcile herself with the men in her past life. She can do that by recognizing her guilt and then atoning for that guilt. This will offer evidence that Franziska can be honest with herself and that she can act in a responsible manner. Otherwise she continues to live in an illusory world in which she believes she need





not face the consequences of her actions.

In her illusory world Franziska perceives the baby as a liberating agent. She wants to believe that the child will provide her with new possibilities in life and help her complete the break with the past. The prospect of having the baby makes her feel she is no longer a victim of Joachim's domination. "Ich bin jemand, der nicht mehr automatisch aufgezogen wird."<sup>54</sup> In fact, however, she remains a victim of past events. The fetus is tangible proof that the past literally lives on inside her. The child only increases Franziska's dependency. This makes her a suitable match for Fabio, who has come to realize that the dependency of a woman is the quality so sadly lacking in his own life. However, Franziska's problems are of such a nature that the appearance of a child on the scene will do little to resolve them.

Although Franziska is unable to make correct moral judgements on her own behalf, she can be very sharp in judging others. This is proved by her estimation of Kramer. Her behavior toward him is highly moral. She returns the money he extorted from the Jewish jeweler on her behalf. She also expresses her intention to report his presence in Venice to the German police. Kramer exclaims, "Menschen wie Sie sind intolerant. Ich bin auch intolerant, und deshalb weiss ich, dass ich mich vor Ihnen in acht nehmen muss."<sup>55</sup>

The comparison which Kramer makes between himself and Franziska is not very flattering to her. "Auschwitz und meine Flucht vor Herbert auf eine Gleichung gebracht, auf die Formel der Intoleranz."<sup>56</sup> Yet the comparison is quite appropriate. Kramer's participation in the crimes at Auschwitz is the result of his intolerance of others. This lack of



tolerance is a consequence of Kramer's lack of conscience of any kind. Franziska's intolerance is not of the same scale as Kramer's, but it stems from a similar lack of conscience.

Franziska accuses Kramer of being a monster because he acted without regard to the moral consequences of his behavior. Her own actions indicate, however, that she is guilty of the same type of behavior and that she deserves a similar appellation. "Bin ich das, was man eine fatale Frau nennt?"<sup>57</sup> Neither Franziska nor Kramer offers a positive picture of action based on human values. On the contrary, the problems of their lives are symptomatic of absence of an effective conscience.

A close examination of Fabio Crepaz reveals that although he represents a more positive character than either Franziska or Kramer, his values and hence the basis for his conscience are not adequate to the moral challenges of modern life.

Fabio's separation from the Communist Party follows the pattern which was established by Andersch in Der Kirschen der Freiheit and which Gregor continues in Sansibar oder der letzte Grund. He abandons the Party when it renounces principles in order to compete with Fascism in a struggle for power. "...an ihrer Stelle erhoben sich die reinen Machtblöcke, die beiden grossen nihilistischen Apparaturen, vor denen alle Ideen verblassten, weil ihr Kampf, wenn er die äusserste Form annahm, das Ende der Zeiten voraussehen liess, die Apokalypse."<sup>58</sup> Fabio recognizes that political ideologies cannot provide moral values. His experience shows him that the conflict caused by the competing political ideologies of the modern world leads to disaster. His initial interest in the Communist Party is evidence that he rejects the Church



as a source of values as well.

Fabio is able to find expression of his real values in the world of classical music. He regards Brahms in particular as an exponent of the values he cherishes. "...dies war das Beste, was das 19. Jahrhundert zu bieten hatte, dachte Fabio; einen musizierenden idealistischen Bürger, aber ohne Heuchelei; liberaler Aufschwung und beseelte Kultur, Brahms hatte daran geglaubt...."<sup>59</sup> For Fabio, liberalism and the idealism he cherishes died in the Fascist and Communist repression which preceded the Second World War. However, even though the values no longer apply, Fabio is reluctant to give them up. He cannot reconcile himself with the present. He lives resignedly in Venice's Jewish ghetto in order that he remain in contact with the vanished past.

Fabio's situation is very sad and, unfortunately, an accurate reflection of the moral climate of contemporary life. The old values were unable to prevent the Holocaust and Hiroshima. Yet they are difficult to abandon, as nothing positive has arisen to take their place in the thinking of the mass of ordinary people. Fabio is an example of someone caught in this dilemma. He clings to the old values, represented for him by classical music, because they give him a point of reference in life. "...aus dem Fehlbodenbrand des Jahrhunderts - der übrigens weiter schwelte - blieb einem nichts anders als eine halb geopfert Violine, die man in guter halber Form weiter spielte...."<sup>60</sup> However, because Fabio adheres resignedly to the values of the past, he is unable to confront dynamically the moral challenges posed by Auschwitz and Hiroshima.

Much as Franziska and Kramer drift through life because they have no values, Fabio is lost because his outmoded values are unequal to the





challenges of modern life. Franziska and Kramer are exponents of nihilism. They are victims of the historical decline of traditional values. The problems in their lives and their lack of values correspond to the moral climate of contemporary life. As unappealing as their characters are, they nonetheless depict accurately the moral vacuity of modern life.

It may seem that Fabio offers a more positive model than either Franziska or Kramer. But it is obvious that his system of values is painfully obsolete. To wish that his values could somehow be resurrected to supplant the nihilism represented by Franziska and Kramer is to indulge in fanciful nostalgia.

Much has been written about the element of escape as a major theme in Andersch's first three novels. Entire treatises have been devoted to the premise that escape is used as a means to accomplish personal fulfillment or to attain some laudable goal. Granted, Andersch's novels are full of people on the run, escaping some form of political or social oppression. This, however, provides us with little information about the message contained in Franziska's story. For her, escape is merely an indication of the extent of her moral vacuity. As demonstrated, she avoids responsibility and refuses to acknowledge her own complicity in creating the very situation she now finds so intolerable.

Karl Markus Michel's contention that the book "wird neue Modelle herausfordern, bei jedem Leser, darin liegt der Reiz und die Bedeutung des Buches"<sup>61</sup> can therefore be believed only in the context of a negative example. Franziska offers a very good example of how not to react to the problems that arise in one's personal life.





In addition to providing a negative moral example, Franziska's characterization indicts modern Western society, in particular German society. The emphasis on financial security and material comfort in the West has been attained at the expense of an effective conscience. Franziska recognizes the falseness of the system. "...das hohe Gehalt, die falsche Ordnung und die falsche Sauberkeit, der Mangel an Ideen, der Mangel an Leidenschaft, nicht einmal das Kind wird mich vor der deutschen Langeweile bewahren...."<sup>62</sup>

Unfortunately, Franziska has no set of values within herself with which to counter the moral vacuity she correctly diagnoses in Western society. She is in the worst sense a product of Western society based on materialism and self-gratification. It is impossible for her to exercise her own will in a manner consistent with a responsible conscience because, as we have seen, there is no central set of real values in her life on which to base conscience.

The irony of Franziska's situation is that although she realizes she has no real moral values, she recognizes, too, that she is ill-equipped to generate values of her own. She possesses neither the courage nor the will to choose the correct course for her life.

"Die grosse Lösung, die richtige Lösung, wird eine sein, die mir nicht die Freiheit lässt, sie zu wählen."<sup>63</sup> Franziska falls into the trap which snares so many individuals; they willingly surrender their ability to make decisions on their own behalf because it relieves them of the burden. It may seem to make life easier, but it also leaves the individual open to manipulation by an outside figure of authority. Such a figure of authority is provided by Fabio, whom Franziska immediately regards as her savior.



In this portrayal of Franziska, one theme reappears from Andersch's previous novels: man is lost unless he has a conscience on which to rely for guidance. In order for the conscience to be effective, the values on which it is based must be true and correct. By true it is meant that the values must be perceived as human values which originate with human beings and which apply to human situations. Mystical and metaphysical expressions of values are acceptable if they are perceived as expressions of values already inherent in man. They are not acceptable if they are viewed as immutable sources of direction for human life. Correct values are those which man deems to be acceptable. They are good and correct because man decides that they are good and correct. Man is the definer of his environment. He determines the conditions, good or bad, under which he exists.

As Andersch demonstrates in his previous novels, when this proper perspective on values is attained, men will not chain themselves to dogma and ideology. They will make decisions based on values which are perceived as originating within the human experience. From this will come actual freedom, as men will regard themselves free to initiate action and not necessarily free from some particular oppression.

Andersch's experiences in Die Kirschen der Freiheit tell us that he believes that real freedom exists in the freedom of choice. His decision to desert the German army represents such a free choice. It gave him a momentary sense of real liberty, although as he admits, the decision meant that, physically, he exchanged one form of imprisonment for another.

Franziska lacks such a perspective on values in her life and she is unable to act in a free manner. She recognizes this deficiency and



attempts to gain freedom by escaping to Venice. However, although her motive is laudable, her method fails. She wants to be free but she cannot gain freedom merely by changing locales.

She can become free only after she undergoes a mental transformation which would change her perception of the source of values. The preceding examination of her behavior shows that Franziska does not look to herself for values. She does not recognize that she must bear the responsibility for her actions. Her behavior in regard to Herbert and Joachim proves that she avoids responsibility. Her escape to Italy is an acknowledgement on her part that she has failed and that she seeks help, yet it offers no solution to her problem. In Italy she expects to find a solution in the values of lower class working people. However, as long as she searches for values from an outside source, she will fail. Outside sources can be helpful, but the values which are transmitted from them must be selectively chosen by the recipient. Franziska has no discretionary agent within her psyche which selects the appropriate values.

It is obvious that during her life in Germany she accepted perverse values without question. Those values condoned the type of life she led with Herbert and Joachim. Her escape to Italy shows that she has begun to question those values. Yet her escape and subsequent liaison with Fabio show that she is still all too eager to accept values indiscriminately from an outside source.

It is difficult to argue that the new set of values provided by Fabio will be of more help to Franziska. She has not lived a life directed from within prior to her escape to Italy. By living with Fabio and his family, she proves that she continues to live a life





dependent on outside sources of values. The reasonable expectation is that her life in Italy will run a course similar to that of her life in Germany.

An indication that she is willing to change her perception of values would be the recognition of her guilt in instigating the triangle relationship with Herbert and Joachim. The fact that she allows the relationship to continue for three years, even though it provides no emotional satisfaction, demonstrates that Franziska lacks a set of values on which she can base her conscience. If she had admitted that she was wrong or if she had attempted to reconcile herself responsibly with Herbert and Joachim, she would have given an indication that she can discriminate among proper values. It would be a more positive sign that she can act to serve her own interests without harming others. By escaping to Venice, she not only hurts Herbert and Joachim, she avoids the problem of finding a central core of values on which to base her conscience.

The message in Franziska's story is consistent with the message conveyed through Andersch's previous characterizations. That is, conscience based on outside direction is ultimately inadequate to deal with life. The proper task for man is to foster growth of inherently human values. None of the characters in Die Rote, Franziska in particular, engage in this important task. In fact, they consciously avoid seeking real human values. Their story is told in a suspenseful manner, but the message they convey can be perceived only by way of negative example.



#### CHAPTER IV - EFRAIM

In his fourth novel, Efraim, Andersch presents the reader with a character who confronts the major moral challenge of the twentieth century. This challenge is presented by the events which took place in Auschwitz. According to conventional morality, Auschwitz should not have occurred. Yet the Holocaust took place and since then man has faced the task of trying to comprehend the crime within the context of explicable human behavior. The task seems impossible, however, because of the magnitude of the crime.

Through the character Georg Efraim, Andersch gives a means with which to deal with Auschwitz. Efraim's answer to the crime is essentially to ignore it. Efraim denies that thinking, rational men could have perpetrated such horror. Instead, he believes the exterminations were the result of coincidence. Efraim believes so thoroughly in his theory of coincidence that it becomes the philosophical basis to his view of life. In Efraim Andersch thoroughly explores the consequences of such a view of life. The reader is left to decide whether Efraim's moral view is an adequate response to the challenge presented by the events at Auschwitz.

Efraim's response to Auschwitz is based partly on a rejection of the Judeo-Christian tradition. "Angesichts von Auschwitz will ich zur Ehre Gottes annehmen, dass es ihn nicht gibt, und zur Ehrenrettung jener Götter, die es sicherlich einmal gegeben hat und die vielleicht noch in irgendeinem vergessenen Winkel von Zeit und Raum dahinvegetieren, dass nichts mehr in Ihrem Schoss verborgen liegt."<sup>64</sup> Humanistic notions,



which would lay the blame for Auschwitz clearly at the feet of man, have no part in Efraim's thinking either. Because Auschwitz is not morally explainable to Efraim in conventional terms, he invents a new system of values with which to comprehend Auschwitz. Efraim's response to a crime which is incomprehensible by conventional values is a view of life which contains no values. To him there appears to be no order or reason in life. He believes there is no guiding hand from a benevolent god nor an all encompassing set of rules which man has deduced through rational observation of earthly events. Early in the narrative he says, "Immer ist alles möglich oder unmöglich. Es gibt keine Gesetze und keine Freiheit."<sup>65</sup>

As a result of this view of life, Efraim can believe that it was pure coincidence and nothing else that Jewish families were exterminated during the Second World War and not twenty years earlier or later. This view makes no moral judgement in regard to Auschwitz, but it explains how it was possible for Auschwitz to occur. According to Efraim it could not have occurred just as easily. The fact that it took place simply proves to him the theory of coincidence.

Efraim finds his belief in coincidence supported by events in contemporary life. "Da ich nicht an gesetzmässige Ideologien glaube, kann ich das Spiel des Zufalls kalt verfolgen, sein chaotisches Wirken konstatieren, ohne irgendwelche Schlüsse ziehen zu brauchen....Der Lauf der Welt wird zum Beispiel eine Folge des Verlaufs von C.s (Chruschtschows) Zuckerkrankheit oder der Treffsicherheit mehrerer Schützen und der Sorglosigkeit eines Präsidenten in Dallas, Texas, sein."<sup>66</sup>

Because Efraim views life in this manner he is a good journalist. He describes events well because he remains distant from them and does





not draw conclusions which detract from the pure presentation of facts. However, this view of life which makes Efraim such a successful journalist also proves Efraim to be a man without moral values. He is content to observe and take notes without making moral judgements. To make a moral judgement would compromise what he perceives to be his professional integrity. Besides, his view of life prevents him from making moral decisions. Thus, his choice of a career perfectly matches his view of life.

Efraim's moral vacuity is evident as well in his relationship with his boss at the newspaper, Keir Horne. Horne has long been the open lover of Efraim's wife, Meg. Efraim accepts the arrangement, partly because of his own feelings of sexual inadequacy, but mostly because he lacks the moral backbone to assert himself. By espousing a view of life which passively accepts all behavior and passes no moral judgement on that behavior, Efraim abrogates his rights to moral indignation. In a world view in which anything is possible, there is no reason why he should upset himself over his wife's adultery. His view of life allows him to rationalize the relationship. This practice leads Efraim to the absurd situation where he is found peeping through Horne's key-hole in order to catch a glimpse of Horne and his wife copulating in Horne's rocking chair. At no time does Efraim express outrage at the relationship nor does he attempt to stop it. By continually rationalizing the relationship as a result of coincidence, Efraim makes himself powerless to stop it.

Similarly, Efraim's lack of moral values allows him to accept the fact that Horne abandoned to the Nazis a young girl he had fathered with a Jewish woman. Even though Horne admits to Efraim that he





abandoned the child and used Efraim to get the information which proves the child did not survive the war, Efraim is not upset with Horne. He is blind to Horne's deceit and guilt because his view of life does not accept rational acts of men, whether good or evil. Instead, Efraim resorts to explaining away Horne's reprehensible deed. He maintains that Horne is the victim of circumstance and coincidence.

Horne allows Efraim to learn of the abandoned child in order that Efraim might share in Horne's guilt. This shows that Horne feels remorse for what he has done. It also proves that Horne has some moral beliefs which engender the feelings of guilt on his part. By simply accepting Horne's actions without any condemnation, Efraim proves that he has no morals. Efraim is incapable of mustering any feeling in regard to what Horne has done. One would feel more comfortable if Efraim rose up in moral indignation and censured Horne for his criminal behavior. One sympathizes with Horne because he is obviously tormented with guilt. No such sympathy can be felt for Efraim because he lacks the guilt engendered by conscience.

In his relationship with his wife, Efraim betrays the same moral spinelessness he shows in regard to Horne. Meg is a talented woman who manages her own business. She has a mind of her own as well as forthright values which she developed in a working-class milieu. She dominates Efraim and sleeps with other men besides Horne. Her treatment of Efraim is humiliating, yet he accepts it all like a meek dog. Occasionally he takes out his sexual frustrations on himself or with a prostitute. Again, without an adequate moral point of reference to guide his actions, Efraim is powerless to deal with Meg. One sympathizes with Meg, even though she uses other men and abuses Efraim. That is



because she has values on which she acts. They are not the most laudable values, yet they are recognizable and they can be opposed by people who do not agree with them. Efraim, on the other hand, has no set values and therefore seems more dangerous than Meg. Anything could happen and he would feel no compunction to express either praise or indignation.

In regard to Anna, the girl he meets in Berlin and with whom he considers a brief dalliance, Efraim cannot decide how he feels. The following illustrates his vacillating thinking, "Ich war heute nach dem Aufwachen in sie verliebt, bin es aber im Augenblick nicht mehr und habe keine Ahnung, ob ich es in einer Stunde, heute abend oder morgen vormittag wieder sein werde. Aber nicht einmal heute morgen, als ich doch in sie verliebt war, besonders während meines Telefonats mit ihr, habe ich mir vorstellen können, wie das weiter gehen soll. Ich breche meine Spekulationen ab und vertiefe mich in die Zeitung."<sup>67</sup> Efraim could continue to speculate all day and he would still be unable to reach a decision in regard to Anna.

Another indication of Efraim's lack of values is his rootlessness. He does not feel bound to any place. Throughout the narrative he continually changes locales among Berlin, Rome, and London. At one point he confesses, "Nirgends fühle ich mich so zuhause wie auf den Rolltreppen der Londoner Untergrundbahnhöfe."<sup>68</sup> Efraim obviously feels best when on the move, but he has nowhere to go. He has no goal in life nor any sense of purpose. He wanders aimlessly and speculates continually about future plans and a possible new career as a novelist. Yet he never decides on concrete action.

One wonders whether Efraim's rootlessness is a cause of his lack of values or whether his lack of values results in his homelessness.



Both are closely linked and Efraim admits the effect of both when he says, "Ich glaube nicht, dass wir für irgend etwas bestimmt sind. Wenn ich bedenke, wie es ist, dass ich Deutscher war and danach Engländer wurde, während ich immer noch Jude bin, kommt es mir vor, als könnte ich ebenso gut Russe oder Massai-Neger oder ein Wolf oder ein Auto sein."<sup>69</sup>

Efraim's predicament reflects the situation of modern man. Many traditional beliefs which gave purpose and meaning to life are now obsolete. For Efraim, the occurrences at Auschwitz are an indication that those values are gone. Auschwitz happened because a moral climate existed in which anything was allowed. "Moral climate" is actually a misnomer because there is nothing "moral" about it. Its chief characteristic is its total lack of morals. In such a climate human beings might just as well have been inanimate objects. Efraim recognizes this and he adopts the theory of coincidence to explain the apparent absurdity of life after Auschwitz.

However, Efraim's theory is an inadequate response to Auschwitz. By rationalizing or attempting to explain away the events at Auschwitz, the theory of coincidence leaves the way open for those events to repeat themselves. If it is mere coincidence that the Holocaust happened forty years ago, then the horrible crimes could quite coincidentally happen again today. Efraim's theory denies the ability of human effort to prevent such a recurrence. By adopting an indifferent attitude, Efraim actually ensures that such an event will occur again.

In order to prevent another Auschwitz, responsible and responsive conscience is imperative. The answer cannot be to abandon values completely. The importance of values is emphasized by Efraim's friend,





Horne, during a conversation about power. Horne believes that power is evil by its nature and that it can be held in check only by custom and tradition. These, he says, should emphasize, "das Bewusstsein vom schlechten Gewissen der Macht, die man als solche jedoch nicht abschaffen dürfe, weil an ihre Stelle nur andere Mächte treten würden, die keine Tradition des Gewissens besäßen, sondern sich für gut hielten, und diese entfesselten Pädagogen wären das Schlimmste; der Terror der Weltverbesserer sei grässlicher als die Schreckenerrschaft einzelner Grosser, die, gequält vom Kerker des Gewissens, in dem sie lebten, aus dem, auszubrechen versuchten."<sup>70</sup>

Horne's words describe what happened in Germany with the rise of Hitler. Hitler had no conscience based on traditional customs and values. He thought himself good and he attempted to remake the world according to his own designs, without any regard for law, tradition, or fellow human beings. He represents one of the unchained pedagogues of whom Horne speaks. In a comparison with Hitler, however, even Efraim does not come out in a favorable light. Hitler acted on the basis of his perverse beliefs in social Darwinism whereas Efraim is unable to act at all. If one believes that human effort has no effect on the course of events, then there is no point in acting. If one believes in nothing, one is unable to recognize good or evil and one is unable to foster good or oppose evil. This is what is frightening about Efraim's view of life. It shirks from the right and duty of man to act in order to oppose evil. Such an attitude assures the emergence of another Hitler.

Efraim believes that man exists, but that there is no reason for man's existence. To those who believe there is a reason Efraim says



that they "haben noch keinen Gedanken daran verschwendet, dass, wenn mein Leben einen Sinn haben soll, auch der Umstand, dass meine Mutter in einer Gaskammer in Auschwitz getötet wurde, sinnvoll sein müsste. Ich weigere mich jedoch, an den Sinn von Zyklon B zu glauben! Nein, wir sind ein Zufall, weiter nichts. Nicht einmal gewürfelt sind wir worden, es sei denn, die Hand, der wir aleatorisch entrollten, wäre die Hand eines Ganoven gewesen. Es gibt keine solche Hand. Es gibt keine Ursache für uns und kein Ziel. Wir existieren. Schluss. Aus. Mehr ist nicht drin."<sup>71</sup>

Livia Wittmann summarizes Efraim's point of view succinctly and places his view of life in the context of modern European intellectual thought. "Efraim hat die grosse Auseinandersetzung mit den zwei massenwirksamsten geistigen und moralischen Systemen, mit Christentum und Marxismus, noch während seiner Vor-Buch-Vergangenheit abgeschlossen. Er hat sich zu der Erkenntnis durchgerungen, dass keines der beiden in sich ein geschlossenes System bildenden Bewegungen das Weltbild eines europäischen Intellektuellen von heute bestimmen könne. Aber sympathisch erscheinenden Zufluchtstätten des Geistes ist er nicht abgeneigt, so etwa der Schicksalsgläubigkeit Keirs, der Zuversicht auf eine Bestimmung des eigenen Lebens, einer Abwandlung der Gottesgläubigkeit (Chassidismus). Seit der Stunde aber, da er von der Judenvergasung, vom Tod seiner Eltern erfuhr, der mit den bis dahin gekannten Kategorien seiner Erkenntnisse nicht zu erklären war, vermochte er weder an Gott noch an dem Menschen vorbestimmtes Schicksal zu glauben."<sup>72</sup>

These statements reveal how crucial the events at Auschwitz were for Efraim. Efraim is a living victim of Auschwitz. At Auschwitz old ideals, traditions, and morals died. Efraim and modern man have been



challenged to fill the moral gap created by Auschwitz. Through the character Efraim, Andersch presents one possible response, Efraim's theory of coincidence. This theory must be discarded, however, because it simply is not adequate to deal with Auschwitz. The theory of coincidence in fact avoids the issue. By sanctioning any action, this theory also provides the moral climate in which another Auschwitz can occur. The evil represented by Auschwitz must be contained by concrete action based on values opposed to such evil. Existential musing and weak-kneed rationalization will not prevent another Holocaust. Efraim deserves our sympathy because he suffered as a result of the war. However, his view of life is unequal to the task of dealing with life after Auschwitz and it must be rejected.

Efraim's one significant confrontation with the Church occurs during his interview with Mother Ludmilla. Andersch's by now perfunctory criticism of the Church is evident in his portrayal of the nun. "Die Nonne vermag sich mit den Greueln der Hitlerdiktatur abzufinden, indem sie Gott auch weiterhin für allmächtig erklärt, sich aber auf den freien Willen des Menschen beruft. So einleuchtend diese Noterklärung sein mag, scheint sie im Grunde ebenso unmoralisch zu sein wie die Anwendung der Zufallstheorie auf die geplanten Morde."<sup>73</sup>

As a representative of the Church's point of view, Mother Ludmilla is of no help whatever in coming to terms with the events at Auschwitz. Wittmann points out that Mother Ludmilla straddles both sides of the issue. On the one hand she considers God to be omnipotent. On the other hand she clearly places the blame for the Holocaust on the free will of man. The question arises, if God is all powerful and if he is the source of goodness, how could He allow something as evil as the





Holocaust to occur? Furthermore, if man can be made responsible for such acts as the Holocaust, why can he not be responsible for all other human behavior on earth, good and bad?

The belief in God is a part of the Judeo-Christian ethic. The belief that man is the definer of his environment and is therefore responsible to himself for the good or bad quality of his life is one of the basic tenets of humanism. In the Introduction it was demonstrated that both viewpoints are incompatible with one another. The duplicity of Mother Ludmilla's position is obvious. Her characterization again demonstrates Andersch's now oft portrayed anti-religious sentiments.

There is no illuminating message, no hope for the future presented in Efraim. Andersch provides a negative example in the main character which shows us how modern man should not respond to the moral challenge presented by Auschwitz and other war atrocities. Andersch's humanistic notions as embodied in his own character or in that of Gregor are absent from the novel. A more positive embodiment of his views appears, however, in Winterspelt, the succeeding novel.





## CHAPTER V - WINTERSPELT

As in Efraim, the reader is presented with a protagonist who does not believe in the ability of human effort to influence events. Dincklage is convinced that man is a product of determinateness and chance. He believes that man constantly reacts to the events around himself. "Ein Melieu-Abstieg oder ein traumatischer Schock, beide durch Zufälle bewirkt, durch falsche Reaktion auf eine Geldentwertung oder durch den Anblick eines Brandes, spielten sich über Generationen hinweg in sogenannte Schicksale ein. Selbst scheinbar ganz freie Willensakte - jemand entschloss sich, einen Berg zu besteigen oder ein Buch zu lesen - waren bedingte Reflexe."<sup>74</sup>

If rational men had an influence on events, it would have been possible to prevent the emergence of someone such as Hitler. The fact that Hitler exists proves to Dincklage that such human control of events is impossible. In the face of a figure such as Hitler, conventional ideas about man and his purpose in life become obsolete. Dincklage cannot accept the thesis that there is a rational explanation for life. "Wie aber nannte man ein Sein, in dem konstante Naturgesetze und reine Willkür sich ineinander verfangen und finster durchdrangen? Man nannte es Chaos. Dincklage war sich der Existenz des Chaos gewiss. Das Chaos allein erklärte ihm, warum es Ungeheuer gab."<sup>75</sup>

In regard to his view of life, Dincklage is similar to the character Efraim. Because of Hitler and Auschwitz, Efraim is unable to comprehend life in traditional terms. Hitler and Auschwitz have made it impossible, for example, to believe that there is a god of mercy who



determines what happens on earth or that rational men control events. For Efraim, coincidence is the determining factor behind life. Dincklage shares that view. In Dincklage's opinion, chance has created the chaos which gives rise to monsters such as Hitler.

In the character of Dincklage Andersch once again illustrates the danger caused by a lack of humanly conceived moral values. Dincklage is an appropriate metaphor with which to illustrate this point. He is presented with a dilemma which requires a moral resolution. As a result, his values are put to a test. The manner in which he abstractly resolves the situation demonstrates how he actually feels. However, because he believes that human involvement has no effect on influencing the course of events, he refuses to act. He is aware of this problem. "Natürlich gab es sogar inmitten des Chaos und angesichts der Ungeheuer ethische Entscheidungen, die Wahl zwischen Gut und Böse, das Gewissen. Sie waren das Letzte, was Dincklage aus seiner katholischen Erziehung übrig behielt. Wahrscheinlich, dachte er spöttisch, handelte es sich auch dabei nur um einen durch das Emsland bedingten Reflex."<sup>76</sup>

Dincklage's Catholic background has given him a knowledge of moral choices and the values on which those choices can be made. Dincklage regards such values as an option only. They are not binding elements of his conscience. He regards his conscience as a reflex taught to him by parents, school, and church. He does not regard it as an inherent part of his conscious self. He views it as abstract, removed from his actual behavior. As a result, he feels that decisions made on the basis of conscience possess validity in an abstract sense only. Such decisions will remain the result of mind games, never to be applied in the real world. Dincklage remains convinced that rational processes of the mind



have no effect on the course of events. "Die wirklichen Dinge bestehen also auch, habe ich gedacht. Man braucht sie nicht vorzustellen."<sup>77</sup>

Pischdovdjan recognizes this fact when he states in regard to Dincklage, "Sein Verhängnis liegt darin, dass es für ihn, nachdem er sich für militärschen Ungehorsam, für Kapitulation und damit für Flucht entschlossen hat, gleichgültig ist, ob der Plan ausgeführt wird oder nicht."<sup>78</sup>

In his mind Dincklage is convinced that his decision to capitulate is the morally correct thing to do. However, because this belief is thought to be unrelated to reality, Dincklage feels no compunction to try to actualize his plan of capitulation. Evidence of this paradoxical attitude is given in the letter Dincklage sends to Kimbrough but which Kimbrough does not receive. In it he gives three reasons why he decided not to implement his plan. In his first reason he claims that his action would have no effect on the course of the war. This statement is Dincklage's own admission that human effort has no effect on the real course of events. Secondly, he states that success of his plan would be the result of pure chance. He believes there is as much chance for success as there is for failure. This admission on the part of Dincklage confirms his belief in the role of coincidence in determining the occurrence of events. Thirdly, he emphasizes how important it was that Schefold come to him through the German lines. It was a sign on the part of Dincklage of how much the capitulation plan meant to him. In this manner he was able to satisfy himself in his mind that, indeed, he was serious about the capitulation plan as a proposal. However, because the plan was relegated long ago to being merely an exercise in Dincklage's mind, it is impossible that it could ever be implemented.





Dincklage was motivated by moral considerations to imagine the plan. He admits, however, that moral considerations are only a reflexive action on his part. They do not determine how Dincklage asserts himself in life. They cannot because Dincklage does not assert himself. To do so would be an admission that his life has some goal or purpose. But as he does not believe in fate or destiny, such assertive action on his part is impossible. Here a further comparison with Efraim is unavoidable. Precisely because both characters believe their lives are without meaning, they act, or more accurately react, accordingly. They are passive wanderers who find no purpose in life nor do they perceive a need for a purpose in life.

Such an attitude manifests itself early in Dincklage's thoughts and behavior. An indication of his feelings is expressed during his student days at Oxford. "Er war so wenig links, dass er sogar die Sowjetunion verteidigte, wenn englische Studenten sie kritisierten, weil sie in Spanien nicht, wie Deutschland und Italien, militärisch intervenierte, sondern nur Waffen lieferte. 'Die Russen rechnen eben mit längeren Zeiträumen', sagte er. Den Vorwurf, er rede damit denen das Wort, die nichts täten, steckte er ein."<sup>79</sup>

This attitude also enables Dincklage to distance himself from the events in the war and to disclaim any responsibility for his part in making the war possible. "Er wunderte sich nur darüber, dass er Satzteile wie wenn wir noch Jäger hätten oder den Namen Hermann Göring noch immer nicht ohne Erbitterung denken konnte. Anstatt mich über den ganzen Saustall zu freuen, dachte er. Schon das winzige Wort wir ist falsch. Was ich, vollständig automatisch, denken müsste, ist: sie haben keine Jäger mehr."<sup>80</sup>



Dincklage also has difficulty speaking of "his" men. When he talks of his soldiers to the other officers, it sounds as if he places the possessive pronoun in parentheses. The tone in Dincklage's voice is so noticeable that he receives a reprimand from his commanding officer.

Käthe Lenk is the first person to notice Dincklage's attitude. "Hinter seiner Bedingung für Schefolds Einsatz spürte sie eine Überzeugung, eine Art des Lebens und Denkens, von der Vernunftgründe abglitten wie Hände von einer Wand, an der sie keinen Halt mehr fanden."<sup>81</sup>

Käthe's observation is an accurate summation of Dincklage's view of life. He does not believe in rational explanations and he cannot be convinced that any action on his part will have an effect on the course of events. The plan which he formulates in his mind corresponds to abstract values which are not perceived as valid in life. The plan, therefore, remains an abstraction.

Käthe's remark also reveals her as a person of opposite characteristics from Dincklage. She believes that acting on the basis of values is an imperative. "Ihr Rat an den jungen Thelan (diese Mischung aus katholischer Erziehung und Mathematik), zu desertieren, war eigentlich ihre erste aktive Handlung politischen Widerstands."<sup>82</sup> This act represents a concrete expression of Käthe's moral values. In contrast to Dincklage, who may imagine such an act but would never actualize it, Käthe not only thinks it but acts it as well. She understands that moral values, if they are to have any meaning, cannot exist in a vacuum to be thought of as abstract options. They must be acted upon.

Her position in regard to Dincklage's plan is clearly moral. She regards it not only as a proper act but as a means for Dincklage to atone for his involvement in the war. "Wenn sein Plan gelang, über-



legte Käthe, so wog er alle von ihm nicht verweigerten Befehle auf."<sup>83</sup>

In contrast to Dincklage, who regards moral values as abstracts, and in opposition to Hainstock, whose Marxist thinking makes him impotent to act without a supportive organization, Käthe is a pragmatist who seeks an end to the war. "Der Frieden interessierte sie nicht. Sie konnte sich unter ihm nicht vorstellen. Was sie interessierte, war das Ende des Krieges."<sup>84</sup>

Her attitude is evident in the manner with which she views history. During an argument with Hainstock about history she says it makes no sense to talk of the past in conditional sentences. Hainstock says her view is reactionary. "Wenn man darauf verzichtet, sich vorzustellen, wie etwas hätte sein können, verzichtet man auf die Vorstellung einer bessern Möglichkeit überhaupt. Dann nimmt man die Geschichte hin, wie sie eben kommt. Wenn sie gekommen ist, wie sie gekommen ist, kann man nicht anderes tun, als sie hinnehmen, hatte Käthe erwidert."<sup>85</sup>

Far from being fatalistic, Käthe's attitude reveals her intense pragmatism. She is not constrained by ideological commitments. Hainstock realizes, "dass er, Anhänger einer Theorie und Praxis der Veränderung, den Anlass zu Schefolds heutigem Gang ablehnte, ihn von Grund aus nicht mochte, indessen Käthe daran nur auszusetzen hatte, dass Schefold es war, der ihn unternahm. Davon abgesehen war sie der Motor des ganzen Unternehmens gewesen. Von Fatalismus konnte da gar nicht die Rede sein."<sup>86</sup>

The sympathetic portrayal of Käthe is a reflection again of the importance Andersch attaches to the actions of individuals who act on the basis of conscience based on clearly defined moral values. The contrast between Käthe and Hainstock emphasizes Andersch's belief.





Hainstock occupies the now well established role of a defeated Communist revolutionary. Because he is a victim of the Party's deterministic philosophy, Hainstock is unable to act in a moral sense. Nor does he perceive of life in terms of human values. His ideological orientation determines his perception of events. "Dieser Krieg, sagte Hainstock, ist der Krieg eines kranken Gehirns. Hitler ist für den Kapitalismus untragbar geworden. Er diskreditiert die bürgerliche Gesellschaftsordnung, zeigt ihre Grundlagen zu offen."<sup>87</sup> Hainstock does not condemn Hitler on moral grounds. His criticism stems from what he perceives as Hitler's distorted relationship with a specific economic class. He deals with Hitler on an abstract level and is therefore unable to initiate effective action against Hitler.

Käthe, however, is able to perceive events in a moral light. She rejects Hainstock's ideologically bound explanations. "Wenn sie sich an ihre Eltern erinnerte, fand Käthe es unmöglich, zu glauben, dass das, was das Ungeheuer machte, die Grundlagen des Denkens von Bürgern enthüllte."<sup>88</sup> Whereas Hainstock is able to extemporize in theoretical terms about the war and its causes, Käthe is moved by its moral implications. Her concern is for the humans involved, not for the theories which try to explain the war.

Hainstock believes Dincklage's plan is impossible to implement because Dincklage lacks ideological support among his own people. He again expresses his conviction that action is impossible without organization. "Die Vorstellung, Dincklage könne über Vertrauensleute, Parteizellen verfügen, setzte voraus, dass dieser selbst über ein klares politisches Bewusstsein verfüge, mehr wäre ein Herr, ein Mensch, nämlich ein Genosse. Lächerlich, sich so etwas vorzustellen. Es handelte sich





um die sinnlose Aktion eines Einzelgängers."<sup>89</sup> Later, Hainstock's criticism of Dincklage becomes more explicit and his ideological basis for the criticism more obvious. "Unhistorisch. Als Marxist glaube ich nicht an den Wert solcher individueller Aktionen."<sup>90</sup> A comparison can be made between Hainstock and Andersch himself in Die Kirschen der Freiheit. Hainstock is a similar victim of Marxist deterministic philosophy. He believes that the actions of men are determined by immutable laws which can be deduced from a proper reading of history. Actions which are not determined by these laws or which do not conform to these laws have no validity. In such a philosophy there is no room for individual choice.

Andersch argues that individuals do not act in accordance with historical laws but according to individual conscience based on a set of values. Acting in such a manner gives meaning and purpose to life. Organized ideologies, such as Marxism, discredit the conscience of the individual. In a system where there is no notion of the individual, there is also no concept of individual rights. When the individual and the rights of the individual cease to matter, the meaning and purpose of life is also put into question. Andersch counters this idea with his own belief in the individual. Only the individual is capable of acting on moral values. A decision reached through conscience is an expression of personality and individuality. As a result, individuals give meaning and purpose to life. Andersch believes this capability of the individual should be encouraged to develop. Organized philosophies such as Marxism and Fascism suppress this inately human quality. These systems of thought deserve to be branded immoral.

The actions of Kimbrough are highly moral and his characterization



corresponds to that of Käthe. In contrast to Dincklage and Hainstock, Kimbrough is able to make moral judgements. For example, he argues that in order to defeat the Nazis it is imperative that one not lower one's self to their level. "Man kann sie nur schlagen, wenn man ihr Denken grundsätzlich nicht annimmt."<sup>91</sup> Here he responds to an assertion by his commanding officer, "dass die Nazis nur von jemand geschlagen werden können, der imstande ist, sich in ihr Denken zu versetzen."<sup>92</sup>

Kimbrough does not look for traditional moral justifications for the war against the Nazis. He believes the United States have entered the war "weil wir Lust haben, einen Krieg zu führen."<sup>93</sup> Arguments to the contrary, based on traditional moral values, fall on deaf ears. It is quite possible that his views would be shared by Käthe, herself unimpressed by church or political ideology. "Für den alten Marxisten Wenzel Hainstock ist es bezeichnend, dass er auf Wheeler rekurriert, während er Kimbroughs Bemerkung über die Lust am Kriegführen glatt überhört, so dass er sie auch Käthe Lenk nicht übermittelt, die - das ist anzunehmen - der Behauptung des Mannes aus Georgia spontan zugestimmt hätte."<sup>94</sup>

In a conversation with Schefold, Kimbrough admits that he is an isolationist. As a Democrat who supported Roosevelt, he was disappointed when Roosevelt committed the United States to war. "Ich bin nicht enttäuscht, sagte Schefold. Ohne Roosevelt würde Hitler neunzig Jahre alt werden. Schafft euch euren Hitler doch selber vom Hals, sagte Kimbrough, nicht grob, aber mit juristischer Kälte."<sup>95</sup> Kimbrough is angry that the United States should have to intervene at all. His response to Schefold is an expression of indignation. Why should the United States have to intervene? What gives the United States the moral



advantage in this war? The United States kill people in a manner just as grotesque as the Nazis. Traditional moral values give a justification for such a war, but are those values proper? Both sides are guilty of murder.

Kimbrough feels morally betrayed by politics. He regards the policy of isolation as the proper course. Leading politicians abandoned that policy, however, and Kimbrough no longer has a political expression of his moral viewpoint.

Kimbrough is opposed to war, but not on religious grounds and not on the basis of political ideology. He detests war because it is an inhuman activity. Human beings should not kill one another, not because God or an abstract philosophy tells them it is wrong, but because they should know it to be wrong inherently. Humans have the choice to avoid war. They should avoid war because it is the human and conscientious thing to do.

"Schefold rätselte daran herum, warum ausgerechnet dieser Isolationist bereit war, für Dincklages Vorhaben einiges zu riskieren, während die ihm vorgesetzten Offiziere, Militärs, die für Roosevelts Kriegsziele wahrscheinlich das grösste Verständnis aufbrachten, den Plan des Majors ablehnten."<sup>96</sup> The solution to Schefold's puzzlement is that Kimbrough recognizes the humanistically moral worth of Dincklage's plan. He is prepared to help implement the plan because it is quite simply the proper thing to do under the circumstances. Kimbrough's superiors have other tactical and strategic considerations in mind. Their view is influenced by traditional values quite apart from those in which Kimbrough believes.

The source of Kimbrough's values can be traced back to the environ-





ment from which he came. "Er war auf einer Farm am Rande von Old Okefenok geboren, und der hatte keinen anderen Wunsch, als dorthin zurückzukehren."<sup>97</sup> Kimbrough has an organic relationship with the area in which he grew up. His sense of place in the world is well established. In the swamp he observed the natural order of life and how man can upset its rhythm. Man intrudes, for example, when he fishes or when he hunts alligators. Kimbrough's father had no compunction about hunting and fishing. He followed the biblical edict which commands man to subdue the earth. Kimbrough is not affected by this command. He refuses to fish and hunt. These activities do not seem right to him. They are actions approved by accepted moral values. He opposes them because of an internal feeling which has nothing to do with God but which comes from the rational processes of his own mind.

An example of this attitude is found in his thoughts about conscientious objectors. "Rechtsanwalt Kimbrough hat sich immer darüber gewundert, dass Deinstverweigerer niemals einen Mangel an gewöhnlichen physischen Mut für ihr Verhalten in Anspruch nahmen. Sie sagten niemals: Was wollt ihr? Wir besitzen die Grundeigenschaften nicht, die ihr vom Soldaten verlangt, und wir denken nicht daran, sie uns anzueignen. In John Kimbroughs Augen hätte ein solches Eingeständnis ihren moralischen Mut schlagend bewiesen. Schlagender jedenfalls als die Berufung auf das fünfte Gebot oder die Lehren von Jesus Christus."<sup>98</sup> Kimbrough realizes that real human values are not imposed from the outside but are generated within. He is an example of Andersch's notion of a humanistic moralist.

There is a paradox here, however. Why did Kimbrough join the army if he is opposed to war? Kimbrough has no satisfactory explanation. "Es hatte keinen Sinn, ihm (zum wievieltenmal?) klarzumachen, dass er,



nicht wegen der Zustände in Georgia freiwillig in die Armee eingetreten war. Die Schwierigkeit bestand darin, dass er niemandem, nicht einmal sich selber, genau erklären konnte, warum er nicht abgewartet hatte, bis die Armee ihn einzog."<sup>99</sup> A plausible explanation is that, although Kimbrough embodies the idea of a humanistic moralist, he is not perfect. His actions are still influenced by traditional values around him. Perhaps these values affect his subconscious and create feelings of guilt which prompt him to join the army.

In Winterspelt Andersch continues the archetypes he introduces in Sansibar oder der letzte Grund. He is still concerned with the problem of how man can maintain the intellectual freedom necessary to deal with moral questions. The characters who are most successful in this endeavor are those who do not look to religion or politics for guidance. As Andersch demonstrates repeatedly, these philosophies all too often take on a separate life of their own and become deterministic in nature. They are then regarded by man as the source of moral guidance, rather than as expressions of moral values which have their true origin in man. Andersch's greatest concern is to demonstrate that true moral action takes place only when this proper perspective to politics and religion is maintained. His books tell us that once man realizes that the actual source of moral values resides in himself, he will have a sounder basis for conscience.



## CONCLUSION

One theme runs through each of the five novels: values and therefore the basis for conscience resides within man. Andersch suggests that man will be more successful in life when this perspective on values is maintained. Otherwise, he argues, man opens himself to manipulation and deception when he allows the locus of his existence to be transferred to an outside religious or political entity.

In Die Kirschen der Freiheit Andersch relates how he came to recognize what he considers to be the true source of values and conscience. As pointed out in Chapter One, the critical moment of this realization did not occur when he decided to desert the army. That was merely the expression of a conclusion he had reached long ago. The realization that values are centered in the individual came when he felt betrayed by the Communist Party. Andersch identified himself so thoroughly with the philosophy of the Party that when the philosophy failed, he failed as well. In this regard he repeats the mistakes of his father, who had also surrendered the locus of his existence and beliefs to political doctrine. However, young Andersch learned from his mistake and was able to assert control over his life dramatically by deserting from the army.

As demonstrated in succeeding chapters, these two incidents in Andersch's life, his desertion from the army and more importantly his recognition of the betrayal by Communist Party philosophy, are repeated in modified form through various characters in the four novels subsequent to Die Kirschen der Freiheit.





Of the four, Sansibar oder der letzte Grund presents the reader with the most clearly drawn retelling of the experiences Andersch underwent in recognizing the duplicity of Communist Party doctrine and the deception inherent in religious doctrine. It is obvious that the three main characters, Knudsen, Gregor, and Helander are based on figures from Andersch's own life and that each experiences the consequences of submitting one's self to political or religious dogma.

In Die Rote Andersch does not succeed as well in translating his perspective on values and conscience into a believable characterization. To be sure, Franziska recognizes the lack of values in her life, yet her response to the situation, as demonstrated in Chapter Three, is irresponsible and it fails to bring about the fundamental change for which she longs.

Most critical reviews of Die Rote concentrate on Andersch's use of escape as an important element of the plot. In it they see the continuation of the escape element from Die Kirschen der Freiheit and Sansibar oder der letzte Grund. Although it is common to each novel, the escape element serves a different purpose in each and the undue attention given to it is out of proportion with its real significance. In Die Kirschen der Freiheit Andersch's escape from the army is the actualization or physical expression of a decision about his life which he made long ago. The escape element is not the primary feature of the plot; it arises from Andersch's perspective on values and conscience. In Sansibar oder der letzte Grund the escape element is evident again. However, in this novel it also plays a secondary role. The plight of Judith and the voyage to Sweden add tension and drama to a good story. Yet this element is overshadowed by the wooden figure, which is the





real center of action in the novel. The figure goads each of the three main protagonists into action. Through their actions, the main characters reveal something of the controlling values in their lives.

In Die Rote the element of escape is once again apparent, yet its role as a primary factor in the plot must be questioned. It seems the escape itself is secondary to the motivation which prompts it.

Franziska's decision to leave for Venice is a reflexive action prompted by her dissatisfaction with an unfulfilling life in Germany. She bears a great amount of responsibility for creating the unhappy conditions in her life; her quick decision to leave indicates that she is unwilling to address her guilt in the matter in a responsible fashion. Her escape allows her to avoid making difficult decisions about herself. It is neither a creative nor responsible reaction to her dilemma. By contrast, Andersch's own escape is a responsible expression of decisions he had made in regard to values in life.

After experiencing such positive characters as Andersch himself in Die Kirschen der Freiheit and Gregor in Sansibar oder der letzte Grund, it is disturbing to come across Franziska. Not only does she fail to achieve personal success in the narrative account, she gives an unclear picture of Andersch's previously well articulated views on values and basis for an effective conscience. Whereas the motivations behind Andersch's previous characters are apparent, the driving force behind Franziska is less clearly described. It seems too simple to say that she is irresponsible and morally bankrupt. One longs for more clues as to why she acts in such a reprehensible manner.

Whereas the element of escape plays roles of varying importance in Andersch's first three novels, it is entirely absent from the



succeeding two works. The question of values, however, continues unabated in Efraim, although in a different manner than in the previous novels. Efraim admits to having no values; his life is based on the premise that caprice and coincidence guide man's life and that it is futile for man to exercise his will in an attempt to influence either of these forces. Andersch is thorough in describing the consequences of such attitudes; Efraim leads a rootless and unsatisfying life because he refuses to ascribe a center of values to himself. Efraim thus becomes a metaphor for the view that a set of humanistically based values is a prerequisite for an effective conscience and a satisfying life. This view is inherent in earlier novels, only in those it receives a more positive representation.

Winterspelt is Andersch's last attempt to deal with the problem of values and conscience in novel form. He relies on stereotypes already developed in earlier novels to articulate the view that values which are perceived to originate within man are the best values. The message remains as unchanged as when it first dawned on Andersch while he was incarcerated for having given too much of himself to Communist Party doctrine.

Thus, the question of values and conscience runs like a thread, sometimes tangled as in Die Rote, through each of Andersch's novels. Andersch also demonstrates that once a proper perspective on values and conscience is attained, true freedom results. The exercise of this freedom does not consist of freeing one's self from oppression, but of acting freely to accomplish something creative, to make a positive choice. It is a freedom which exists when man is able to choose freely on the basis of knowledge, unfettered by religious cant



or political doctrine. "War es nicht für Erasmus bezeichnend, dass er sich den Religionsstreitigkeiten entzog, um seinem 'eigenen objektiven Urteil nachzugehen und zu handeln?' Seine geistige Unabhängigkeit war ihm das Wichtigste, und im Bewusstsein der von ihm erreichten Einsicht hoffte er, 'die gebildete Menschheit zu einer höheren Stufe führen zu können', sah er sich als 'Bringer geistiger Freiheit und Schöpfer neuer geistiger Werte'."<sup>100</sup> Andersch's novels suggest that man should base conscience on similar independence from dogma and ritual. To re-emphasize the point, two advantages accrue from this attitude: a sound basis for conscience is achieved and real freedom, a creative freedom, is attained. This double point is illustrated best in Die Kirschen der Freiheit. Andersch describes not only the humanistic basis for his conscience, he relates the heady freedom it affords him in allowing him to dare and undertake desertion from the army. His act of desertion is the result of free choice based on an open-minded approach to values.

In Sansibar oder der letzte Grund Andersch again establishes the connection between actual freedom and a conscience unfettered by religious and political dogma. Knudsen and Helander are almost powerless to act when confronted with real evil because of the constraints imposed on their natural, humane impulses. Gregor, who escapes the stranglehold of the Party's deterministic philosophy, is able to initiate action which helps someone escape the evil. Gregor's intellectual freedom results in tangible freedom as well.

This theme is evident in different form in Die Rote and Efraim. Franziska's escape from her husband and her lover does not lead to freedom. In the end she submits to the control Fabio exercise over





her life, just as she submitted to the perversions to which Herbert and Joachim subjected her. Franziska is unable to exist independently because she lacks the strong conscience needed to decide matters for herself. She readily allows others to control her life. Her main concern is to find a secure home where others can make difficult decisions for her, decisions to which she is eager to submit. Her passive acceptance of the control others exert on her and her willing submission to such control are reminiscent of the human situation which existed during the Middle Ages when the Church was in power.

Efraim offers a negative example as well. His conscience is devoid of positive values. Because he has no real values, it is impossible for him to take decisive action in the course of daily life. He believes his destiny is shaped by forces beyond his control; he is therefore content to drift through life. His meek submission to these forces leaves him open to manipulation, an opportunity his domineering wife readily exploits.

With Winterspelt Andersch returns to old ground. The characterizations have appeared before. Now they return within a narrative which is interspersed with documented historical facts. The message remains the same; intellectual freedom leads to true basis of conscience which in turn expresses itself in free actions.

Andersch's novels deal with a timeless theme. The question of the ultimate source of values and of conscience is a matter which will continue to be researched and debated. It is highly unlikely that any binding conclusion will ever be reached. The division between humanists and political and religious dogmatists will continue until the unlikely time when one side agrees with the other.



Andersch's novels present a compelling case for the side of the humanists. Humanistic reasoning recognizes that moral values and the conscience which they engender are inherent to human beings. Values and conscience are believed to exist irrespective of religious dogma or political doctrine. Such dogma and doctrine are only codified expressions of the inherent values. Andersch's successful characters overcome a learned dependence on these physical expressions of values and behave according to the values themselves. They offer positive examples of conscience based on humanistic ethics.



## NOTES

<sup>1</sup>Carl Gustav Jung, "Das Gewissen in psychologischer Sicht", Das Gewissen als Problem, ed. Nikolaus Petrilowitsch, (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1966), pp. 57-58.

<sup>2</sup>Jacques Maritain, Moral Philosophy - An Historical and Critical Survey of the Great Systems, (New York: Charles Scribner's and Sons, 1964), p.11.

<sup>3</sup>Maritain, Moral Philosophy, p. 17.

<sup>4</sup>Alfred Andersch, Die Kirschen der Freiheit, in Bericht Roman Erzählungen, (Olten und Freiburg im Breisgau: Walter Verlag, 1965), p. 81.

<sup>5</sup>Christoph Burgauner, "Zur Romankunst Alfred Anderschs", Bericht Roman Erzählungen, (Olten und Freiburg im Breisgau: Walter Verlag, 1965), p. 436.

<sup>6</sup>Kristina Bollina, "Pläydoyer für das Engagement", interview with Alfred Andersch, Über Alfred Andersch, ed. Gerd Haffmans, (Zürich: Diogenes Verlag, 1974), p. 113.

<sup>7</sup>Karl Markus Michel, "Die Rote", Über Alfred Andersch, ed. Gerd Haffmans, (Zürich: Diogenes Verlag, 1974), p. 70.

<sup>8</sup>Andersch, Kirschen, p. 45

<sup>9</sup>Andersch, Kirschen, pp. 9-10.

<sup>10</sup>Andersch, Kirschen, p. 10.

<sup>11</sup>Andersch, Kirschen, p. 11.

<sup>12</sup>Andersch, Kirschen, p. 11.

<sup>13</sup>Andersch, Kirschen, p. 13.

<sup>14</sup>Andersch, Kirschen, p. 20.

<sup>15</sup>Andersch, Kirschen, p. 27.



<sup>16</sup>Andersch, Kirschen, p. 15.

<sup>17</sup>Andersch, Kirschen, p. 67.

<sup>18</sup>Andersch, Kirschen, p. 18.

<sup>19</sup>Andersch, Kirschen, p. 57.

<sup>20</sup>Andersch, Kirschen, pp. 60-61.

<sup>21</sup>Livia Wittman, Alfred Andersch, (Stuttgart: Verlag W. Kohlhammer, 1971), p. 21.

<sup>22</sup>Andersch, Kirschen, p. 22.

<sup>23</sup>Gerhard Szczesny, Die Zukunft des Unglaubens - Zeitgemässe Betrachtungen eines Nichtchristen, (München: Paul List Verlag, 1958), p. 184.

<sup>24</sup>Alfred Andersch, Sansibar oder der letzte Grund, in Bericht Roman Erzählungen, (Olten und Freiburg im Breisgau: Walter Verlag, 1965), p. 111.

<sup>25</sup>Andersch, Sansibar, p. 96.

<sup>26</sup>Andersch, Sansibar, p. 216.

<sup>27</sup>Andersch, Sansibar, pp. 167-168.

<sup>28</sup>Andersch, Sansibar, p. 103.

<sup>29</sup>Andersch, Sansibar, p. 104.

<sup>30</sup>Andersch, Sansibar, p. 161.

<sup>31</sup>Andersch, Sansibar, p. 122.

<sup>32</sup>Andersch, Sansibar, p. 121.

<sup>33</sup>Andersch, Sansibar, p. 121.

<sup>34</sup>Andersch, Sansibar, p. 121.

<sup>35</sup>Andersch, Sansibar, p. 184.





<sup>36</sup>Andersch, Sansibar, p. 202.

<sup>37</sup>Andersch, Sansibar, p. 109.

<sup>38</sup>Andersch, Sansibar, p. 173.

<sup>39</sup>Andersch, Sansibar, p. 175.

<sup>40</sup>Andersch, Sansibar, p. 175.

<sup>41</sup>Andersch, Sansibar, p. 172.

<sup>42</sup>Wittmann, Alfred Andersch, p. 42.

<sup>43</sup>Andersch, Sansibar, p. 88

<sup>44</sup>Alfred Andersch, Die Rote, (Olten und Freiburg im Breisgau: Walter Verlag, 1960), p. 228.

<sup>45</sup>Andersch, Rote, p. 27.

<sup>46</sup>Andersch, Rote, p. 68.

<sup>47</sup>Andersch, Rote, p. 28.

<sup>48</sup>Andersch, Rote, p. 27.

<sup>49</sup>Andersch, Rote, p. 48.

<sup>50</sup>Andersch, Rote, p. 187.

<sup>51</sup>Andersch, Rote, p. 88.

<sup>52</sup>Andersch, Rote, p. 150.

<sup>53</sup>Andersch, Rote, p. 18.

<sup>54</sup>Andersch, Rote, p. 160.

<sup>55</sup>Andersch, Rote, p. 228.

<sup>56</sup>Andersch, Rote, p. 228.



<sup>57</sup>Andersch, Rote, p. 24.

<sup>58</sup>Andersch, Rote, p. 141.

<sup>59</sup>Andersch, Rote, p. 78.

<sup>60</sup>Andersch, Rote, p. 79.

<sup>61</sup>Michel, "Die Rote", p. 70.

<sup>62</sup>Andersch, Rote, p. 110.

<sup>63</sup>Andersch, Rote, p. 166.

<sup>64</sup>Alfred Andersch, Efraim, (Zürich: Diogenes Verlag, 1967), pp. 89-90.

<sup>65</sup>Andersch, Efraim, p. 17.

<sup>66</sup>Andersch, Efraim, p. 66.

<sup>67</sup>Andersch, Efraim, pp. 175-176.

<sup>68</sup>Andersch, Efraim, p. 130.

<sup>69</sup>Andersch, Efraim, p. 179.

<sup>70</sup>Andersch, Efraim, pp. 255-256.

<sup>71</sup>Andersch, Efraim, pp. 179-180.

<sup>72</sup>Wittmann, Alfred Andersch, p. 63.

<sup>73</sup>Wittmann, Alfred Andersch, p. 64.

<sup>74</sup>Alfred Andersch, Winterspelt, (Zürich: Diogenes Verlag, 1974), p. 56.

<sup>75</sup>Andersch, Winterspelt, p. 56.

<sup>76</sup>Andersch, Winterspelt, p. 56.

<sup>77</sup>Andersch, Winterspelt, p. 488.



<sup>78</sup>Hrair Pischdovdjian, Menschenbild und Erzähltechnik in Alfred Anderschs Werken, (Zürich: Juris Druck und Verlag, 1978), p. 132.

<sup>79</sup>Andersch, Winterspelt, p. 43.

<sup>80</sup>Andersch, Winterspelt, p. 47.

<sup>81</sup>Andersch, Winterspelt, p. 198.

<sup>82</sup>Andersch, Winterspelt, p. 258.

<sup>83</sup>Andersch, Winterspelt, p. 277.

<sup>84</sup>Andersch, Winterspelt, p. 240.

<sup>85</sup>Andersch, Winterspelt, pp. 99-100.

<sup>86</sup>Andersch, Winterspelt, p. 101.

<sup>87</sup>Andersch, Winterspelt, p. 32.

<sup>88</sup>Andersch, Winterspelt, p. 33.

<sup>89</sup>Andersch, Winterspelt, p. 284.

<sup>90</sup>Andersch, Winterspelt, p. 347.

<sup>91</sup>Andersch, Winterspelt, p. 31.

<sup>92</sup>Andersch, Winterspelt, p. 30.

<sup>93</sup>Andersch, Winterspelt, p. 31.

<sup>94</sup>Andersch, Winterspelt, p. 32.

<sup>95</sup>Andersch, Winterspelt, p. 34.

<sup>96</sup>Andersch, Winterspelt, pp. 34-35.

<sup>97</sup>Andersch, Winterspelt, p. 423.

<sup>98</sup>Andersch, Winterspelt, p. 443.





<sup>99</sup>Andersch, Winterspelt, p. 419.

<sup>100</sup>Adolph Bohlen, Moderner Humanismus, (Heidelberg: Quelle und Meyer, 1957), p. 200.



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